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XABSTRACT
PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL SYMPTOMS AND THEIR RELATION TO 
PARANORMAL BELIEF AND ILLUSORY JUDGMENT 
by Michael P. Cofrin 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2006
The relationship between psychopathological symptoms and paranormal belief 
and abilities was explored in four studies. Study 1 investigated the relationship between 
depressive symptoms and paranormal belief. Study 2 shifted the investigation into the 
laboratory by testing participants’ illusory judgments on a paranormal task and assessing 
the relationship between their judgments and depressive symptoms. Study 3 combined 
scale and lab tasks testing for additional psychopathological symptoms and illusory 
judgment on four paranormal tasks. Study 4 incorporated techniques to increase illusion 
of control induction and minimize context effects and fatigue. Psychosis proneness and 
mood symptoms were positively related to general paranormal belief consistently across 
three paranormal belief scales and illusory judgment on three paranormal tasks. The 
results are consistent with a body of literature that suggests atypical thinking as a 
commonality among people reporting psychopathology symptoms and paranormal and 
other types of magical thinking.
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1INTRODUCTION
Hardly a culture has existed that has not expressed either through writing or 
folklore a belief in or experience with paranormal phenomena. Such beliefs often rely on 
personal experience and anecdotes, the extent of which includes a substantial portion of 
the population. For example, more than 25% of Americans believe in witches, 41% in 
possession by the devil, 50% in extrasensory perception (ESP), and 45% believe that 
extraterrestrials visit the Earth (Ehrlich, 2003). Gallup (1997) reported that more than 
90% of Americans believe in at least one paranormal phenomenon.
Given the extent of belief in paranormal phenomena in the populace, the search 
for cognitive and mental health explanations for such beliefs is not surprising. The 
investigation of cognitive and personality correlates of paranormal belief has been a 
prominent avenue of psychological inquiry. The majority of research in this area has 
focused on cognitive deficits and psychopathological symptoms and their relation to 
paranormal belief. The focus of this dissertation is on the association between 
psychopathological symptoms and paranormal belief. This relationship is explored by 
administering paranormal belief scales as a measure of general paranormal belief and by 
assessing illusion of control as a proxy measure of belief in paranormal abilities. The 
investigation begins with a pilot study that explores the relationship between self- 
reported depressive symptoms and general paranormal belief, and a second study that 
assesses the relationship between another self-report measure of depressive symptoms 
and illusion of control on a paranormal laboratory task. The focus and extent of analyses 
broadens in the third and fourth studies by increasing the number of psychopathology
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2measures, the number of paranormal belief scales, and the number of paranormal 
laboratory tasks.
The present investigation does not examine psychopathology. In four studies, a 
limited set of psychopathological symptoms and their relation to paranormal belief and 
judgments on paranormal tasks are examined. The primary goal was to assess the extent 
that general paranormal belief and illusion of control on laboratory tasks vary as a 
function of psychopathological symptoms. Although the following studies do not tap 
clinical syndromes, to the extent that the results obtained from nonclinical samples 
parallel the results obtained from clinical samples, albeit to a lesser degree, studies of 
nonclinical samples may provide a window into beliefs among clinical samples. 
Investigating the association between paranormal beliefs and psychopathological 
symptoms might provide valuable insights into mechanisms underlying a broader range 
of psychopathology.
The following literature review begins with definitions and conceptions of 
paranormal belief to provide a basic understanding of the construct. Because paranormal 
belief extends to such a wide range of alleged phenomena, numerous scales have been 
developed to tap the various dimensions. The most common paranormal belief scales 
used in parapsychological research will be reviewed. Two primary areas of research 
explore the cognitive deficits hypothesis and the association between psychopathological 
symptoms and paranormal belief. Both lines of research will be reviewed, followed by a 
review of individual difference variables that have been shown to be associated with 
psychopathological symptoms and paranormal belief. The introduction will conclude 
with a summary of paranormal belief research findings and a suggested integration.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3Definitions and Conceptions of Paranormal Belief
Paranormal is rarely defined for or by the layperson. The term is used freely and 
its usage is vague; yet its meaning appears to be clear to most people. However, as 
Mabbett (1982) contended, the more closely the definition is scrutinized, the more 
difficult and problematic the definition becomes. Irrespective of whether a particular 
phenomenon can be explained or considered inexplicable according to scientific laws, 
Mabbett explained that as individuals impose order to make sense of their experiences, 
individualized patterns converge to form a cosmology that is intuitively sensed. 
Paranormal phenomena are psychological, and an ostensible paranormal phenomenon is 
termed paranormal when it is “not consonant with our own (in fact, scientific) cosmology 
. . . and is consonant with some (alien) cosmology in which the relationship between 
personal identity and physical environment is radically different from the relationship 
postulated in one’s own mind” (p. 352). A paranormal phenomenon is considered 
genuine “if there is available an (alien) cosmology . . .  which is capable in principle of 
accounting for the total of all known phenomena more simply and parsimoniously than 
one’s own cosmology” (p. 352).
Belief in the paranormal was thought to be at one point a unitary construct. For 
example, Randall and Desrosiers (1980) factor analyzed belief scores and proposed a 
single factor, supernaturalism. Most parapsychologists support the view that paranormal 
belief is multifaceted. The number of factors, however, is still debated. A frequently cited 
operational definition in parapsychological research defines paranormal as alleged 
processes that in principle are physically inconceivable or outside the realm of human 
capabilities as presently understood by conventional scientists (Irwin, 1993; Lawrence,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41995). Tobacyk (1995) criticized such a limited domain definition, because it includes 
only alleged phenomena of which humans are the locus. Such beliefs encompass 
telepathy (mind-to-mind communication), clairvoyance (remote viewing without the aid 
of technology), precognition (seeing the future without relevant knowledge), and 
psychokinesis (ability to move objects via mental effort). Collectively, all four 
phenomena are often categorized as psi, which generally refers to mind-to-mind or mind- 
to-matter control, influence, or communication. Excluding psychokinesis or telekinesis, 
the above terms might also be referred to as ESP in the literature.
Tobacyk (1988) proposed a more comprehensive definition of paranormal belief, 
which includes three additional entities to which paranormal phenomena is attributed 
aside from self or other. The target of attribution could also be impersonal forces (e.g., in 
superstitious beliefs), objects (e.g., mana or holy object), or extrahuman conscious 
entities (e.g., angels). According to Lawrence (1995), Tobacyk’s guide for 
conceptualizing paranormal belief was Broad’s (1978) definition, which considered a 
particular phenomenon paranormal if its explicability is achieved only by major revision 
of the basic limiting principles of science. As Lawrence opines, neither Broad nor 
Tobacyk clearly explained the limiting principles that phenomena must conflict with to 
be considered paranormal, although some are self-evident or unquestioned (e.g., effect 
cannot precede its cause). Regardless of the criteria, Lawrence argued that the definition 
is problematic because it encompasses phenomena for which humans are not the loci. For 
example, according to the basic limiting principle definition, Tobacyk and Milford (1983) 
included the extraordinary life forms domain in the Paranormal Belief Scale, but 
Lawrence argued that the domain does not conform to the basic limiting principle
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5definition (Lawrence, 1995). Their “existence (or not) of any of these things is merely a 
matter of natural historical fact. Only detection of them with certainty will show that they 
do exist, but their paranormal status would have to be much the same as” (p. 24) other 
discovered species that were previously considered unlikely to exist. For this reason, 
Lawrence suggested the more restricted definition of Irwin (1993), which includes only 
the domains that are attributed to ostensible human capabilities and processes that share 
in common the dependence on unexplained principles of nature, namely, psi phenomena 
as the core of paranormal belief.
Belief Scales
The number of scales used by researchers indicates the variation in the range and 
extent of alleged paranormal phenomena. Generally, all of the scales claim to measure 
the same construct of paranormal belief and experiences (Goulding & Parker, 2001). The 
sheep-goat scales narrowly define paranormal belief by distinguishing between “sheep” 
who have strong psi beliefs, and “goats” who reject psi phenomena (Thalboume & 
Haroldsson, 1980). One of the most widely used instrument in parapsychological 
research is the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS; Thalboume, 1995), which comprises 
16 items that tap beliefs and experiences in telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and 
psychokinesis, plus two additional items that address life after death, totaling 18 forced- 
choice items. The ASGS can also be administered with a visual analogue scale.
The more encompassing scales include dimensions that parapsychologists 
generally believe are beyond conceptual boundaries of paranormal belief research 
(Goulding & Parker, 2001). For example, the revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS-R; 
Tobacyk, 1988) includes items that tap not only psi phenomena but also traditional
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6religious beliefs, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, and extraordinary life forms. 
Another commonly used scale is the Belief in the Paranormal Scale (BPS; Jones, Russell, 
& Nickel, 1977), and a less commonly used scale is the Extraordinary Belief Inventory 
(Otis & Alcock, 1982).
The broad nature of these scales suggests that paranormal belief is 
multidimensional. The number o f factors and the orthogonal nature o f the factors vary 
substantially across these assessments. One concern is that generalized results might 
imply a unidimensionality of paranormal belief, even though the results are based on a 
limited number o f paranormal belief dimensions (Irwin, 1993). Another concern of 
paranormal assessment is that a statistical effect related to overall paranormal belief or to 
one type of paranormal belief might not apply to specific dimensions. For example, an 
individual might score moderately high in general paranormal belief, which might imply 
a unidimensional belief, yet believe in or have had putative experiences in a limited 
number of dimensions.
Theoretical Explanations of the Origins of Paranormal Belief 
Multiple factors have been postulated to account for paranormal belief. 
Hypothesized models of paranormal belief origins and functions place importance on 
societal context (e.g., Irwin, 1992), which is suggested to influence the development of 
paranormal beliefs through cultural knowledge and artifacts. Before forming personal 
philosophies and worldviews, children are influenced and possibly indoctrinated by 
people with authority such as parents and educators. Singer and Benassi (1981) 
speculated that, among other sources, extraordinary or paranormal beliefs might arise out 
of deficient or erroneous science education. Harrold and Eve (1987) reported from their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7analysis o f a university sample that students not only lack basic scientific knowledge, 
they possess instead a hodgepodge of ideas about astrology, Bigfoot, UFOs, and 
creationism. Crapo’s (2005) preliminary findings across multiple university samples 
show that pseudoscientific and paranormal beliefs remain relatively high. According to 
Crapo, students often are exposed to and not disabused of pseudoscience or paranormal 
belief by science educators who themselves have been shown to report high levels of 
pseudoscientific and paranormal belief. For example, Kallery (2001) reported that in a 
Greek sample of educators, 60% subscribed to astrological principles and 59% could not 
distinguish between scientific and pseudoscientific disciplines of astronomy and 
astrology respectively.
The media is also likely to play a large role in contributing to such beliefs (Randi, 
1992; Singer & Benassi, 1981). Randi (1992) suggested that the prevalence of absurd 
beliefs among the masses of every culture “is to be found in the uncritical acceptance and 
promotion of these notions by the media” (p. 80). Few studies have investigated the 
relationship empirically. Sparks, Nelson, and Campbell (1997) found that the viewing of 
reality-style paranormal television shows was significantly correlated with paranormal 
belief. The viewing habits of high believers appear to be that they read more material and 
watch more television with paranormal themes than nonbelievers (Auton, Pope, &
Seeger, 2003). Sparks and Pellechia (1997) investigated the impact of a printed news 
story when the academic community supported a putative paranormal event. Participants 
were more likely to report UFO beliefs when the news story included a scientific 
authority in favor of UFOs. Moreover, believers persevered in their UFO beliefs after a 
scientific authority discredited the story.
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8In short, researchers have reasoned that the synergistic effects of the influence 
from authority figures advocating the veridicality of paranormal phenomena (or the lack 
o f disabusing such claims), the media, and other cultural influences are likely to 
determine paranormal beliefs. However, paranormal relevant information is filtered 
through the individual’s psychological processes. Thus, psychological factors are 
suspected to play a role in the formation and maintenance of such beliefs. Malinowski 
(1948) observed Melanasian islanders resorting to magical rituals under times of 
uncertainty, that is, when outcomes were unpredictable. Irwin (1993) explained that, for 
various reasons (e.g., traumatic experiences), some children develop a heightened need 
for control, “which tends to make more salient the occurrence of anomalous and 
uncontrollable events in the individual’s life” (p. 28). He further suggested that fantasy 
proneness facilitates the endorsement of paranormal belief, which serves as an illusion of 
control. Moreover, the endorsement of paranormal claims might serve as a cognitive 
defense against uncontrollable and potentially threatening events (Schumaker, 1990).
Singer and Benassi (1981) suggested that paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs 
might arise from errors in human judgment. In Benassi, Singer, and Reynolds (1980), for 
example, participants misinterpreted normal or staged events as paranormal. Whether 
from cognitive stubbornness or cognitive fallacies, prior beliefs and worldviews appear to 
predispose people to find evidence of relationships when none exist or to arrive at 
conclusions that are beyond what the evidence justifies. These errors might imply that 
believers are deficient in cognitive processes or skills. Although findings are mixed, the 
trend is that paranormal believers tend to be outperformed by skeptics in cognitive tasks, 
including critical thinking and reasoning skills. Irwin (1993), in his review of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9paranormal literature, coined the term cognitive deficit hypothesis, which refers to the 
assumption that cognitive deficiencies are positively associated with paranormal belief. A 
brief review of the cognitive deficit hypothesis research is provided below, followed by a 
review of studies that investigated the relationship between psychopathological 
symptoms and paranormal belief, which is the primary focus of the present investigation.
Cognitive Deficit Hypothesis 
The majority o f cognitive deficit research has assessed differences among 
believers and nonbelievers in critical thinking or reasoning skills, and probability 
judgments. For example, Messer and Griggs (1989) found academic achievement to be 
negatively correlated with paranormal belief and people involved in paranormal 
practices. They surveyed incoming college first-year students and found that males who 
believed in ESP, psychokinesis, and firewalking, and females who believed that they had 
personally experienced precognition during dreams had significantly lower course grades 
at the end of the semester than their skeptical and uninvolved counterparts. The authors 
suggested that a lack o f critical thinking among believers and people involved in 
paranormal practices accounted for the lower grades. Although course grades are not 
direct measures of critical thinking, their conclusions are consistent with the results 
reported in other studies of a negative association between critical thinking and levels of 
paranormal belief (Alcock & Otis, 1980; Gray & Mill, 1990). Dudley (1999) 
demonstrated how memory processes might be involved. When participants engaged in a 
task that interfered with short-term memory, they scored higher in paranormal belief, 
suggesting that memory deficits interfere with critical thinking, which results in an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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increase in irrational belief. The findings, albeit post hoc, are notable, because few 
studies have examined differences in specific memory processes.
Researchers have also examined the probability misjudgment hypothesis -  that 
paranormal believers make more errors in probability judgments and underestimate 
chance coincidences to a greater degree than nonbelievers. Blackmore and Troscianko 
(1985) found higher error rates in probabilistic reasoning among high paranormal 
believers, but when Musch and Ehrenberg (2002) controlled for grades the relationship 
weakened. In contrast, Roberts and Seager (1999) found that conditional reasoning, not 
probabilistic reasoning, predicted paranormal belief.
Contrary to the findings in the cognitive deficits literature, a handful of studies 
failed to find relationships between cognitive complexity (Tobacyk, 1983), reasoning 
skills (Irwin, 1991), or critical thinking (Morgan & Morgan, 1998; Royalty, 1995) and 
paranormal belief. The relationship might depend on the type of paranormal belief. For 
example, only traditional religious believers consistently exhibit less critical thinking 
than nonbelievers (Irwin, 1991; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).
Lesser and Paisner (1985), who examined magical thinking on formal operational 
adults, might clarify the inconsistencies. Their results challenge Piaget’s theory on the 
development of causal notions in children. According to Piaget, a child possesses a 
primitive understanding of reality and causality. In formal operations, ontological 
egocentrism abates as the child develops logical thought through deduction. During this 
stage, the child develops the notion o f chance in search for coherence in an ambiguous 
world. What was once fused, logic and causality become differentiated, following 
separate but interdependent developmental paths. Piaget maintained that under highly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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anxious or psychopathological states adults might reify a concept, event, or outcome that 
is beyond their control by projecting, like a child, onto the outside world a reality based 
on magical thinking. Lesser and Paisner suggested that notions of causality and logic 
operate independently. They compared secular and New Age participants’ logical 
reasoning and causal concepts based on participants’ expositions. The data did not reveal 
a difference between the two groups in logical reasoning, but a difference emerged in the 
latter’s causal concepts. Similar to children, many of the New Age expositions indicated 
that they rejected the notion of chance and their explanations were characteristic of 
magical thinking; but unlike children, they possessed a highly developed metacognitive 
awareness of their causal associations, which the authors believe develops into maturity, 
operating in concert with but independently from logic.
Williams and Irwin (1991) found a similar distinction in causal concepts among 
psychical research society members and schizophrenics. The contents of each group’s 
casual concepts tended to include magical thinking, and the two groups differed little in 
paranormal belief. However, schizophrenics’ causal concepts relied on the role of chance 
to a greater extent than psychical research society members who, like Lesser and 
Paisner’s (1985) New Age participants, tended to frame their causal concepts in terms of 
personal responsibility and meaningful connections. A reasonable argument follows that 
among adults there is great variability in the extent that magical thinking has permeated 
causal concepts; critical thinking or other cognitive skills might vary independently of the 
causal concept. The link is likely to depend on other causal concept features. This might 
explain why researchers consistently show differences in paranormal belief but reveal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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inconsistent degrees of cognitive complexities in their attempts to differentiate believers 
from nonbelievers.
A cognitive characteristic that appears to be consistent in believers is a greater 
tendency to form causal links than nonbelievers. Hergovich (2003), using the Embedded 
Figures Test to measure field dependence and independence, found that field dependent 
subjects who were less able to discern signal from noise or separate relevant material 
from its context had greater levels o f paranormal belief than field independent subjects, 
although the relationship was significant for only the superstition dimension. Blackmore 
(1994), on the other hand, found that general paranormal belief was associated with a 
greater tendency to make positive visual identifications to noisy stimuli, but with fewer 
overall correct identifications and more frequent misidentifications of people than 
nonbelievers. The results suggest that believers possess a greater tendency to draw 
inferences than nonbelievers, but they also exhibit less cognitive abilities relevant to 
making accurate identifications than nonbelievers. This conclusion bears a resemblance 
to the errors in judgment observed by Benassi et al.’s (1980) students who believed that a 
staged event was paranormal.
Gianotti and Mohr (2001) proposed an alternative interpretation for the 
differences in cognitive processing between believers and nonbelievers. Employing a 
signal detection model, they proposed that paranormal belief could arise from the 
tendency to bridge an associative gap between two temporally coinciding but unrelated 
events. They reasoned that believers dismiss or lack the notion of random origin, 
consequently inferring paranormal causation once a meaningful bridge is formed. Using 
an associated word task, subjects who believed in the paranormal provided more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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uncommon associations for unrelated words (semantic noise) than nonbelievers who 
made more meaningful semantic connections (semantic signal). Similar to the results in 
Blackmore (1994), believers were more susceptible than non-believers to unfounded 
inferences because they also exhibited an enhanced readiness to associate to a stimulus. 
Their personal meaning relied on subjective rather than objective evaluation. The authors 
purported that the results might reflect believers’ enhanced processing that resembles 
cognitive creativity, not a cognitive deficit. In extreme forms, however, disinhibition of 
associations within semantic networks is suggestive of disordered thinking exhibited by 
schizophrenics (Pizagalli, Lehmann, & Brugger, 2001).
In sum, research suggests that paranormal believers have atypical cognitions, 
which may include judgment errors (e.g., underestimating chance coincidences), atypical 
associative processing (e.g., loose semantic associations), and magical thinking. Evidence 
also exists indicating that atypical thinking or unrealistic beliefs are also characteristic of 
thought disorders (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Exploring the relationship between 
paranormal belief and psychopathological symptoms might further elucidate this 
commonality.
Psychopathological Symptoms and Paranormal Belief
By creating meaning or a sense of control over chance events, paranormal beliefs 
might provide an adaptive anxiety-reducing defense against life’s uncertainties 
(Schumaker, 1990; Williams & Irwin, 1991). The development of causal concepts 
characterized by drawing unfounded inferences or by forming associations between 
events that normally are not causally related could be motivated by a need to create an 
illusion of mastery or control over events that are uncontrollable (Blackmore, 1997; &
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Goulding & Parker, 2001; Langer, 1975; Singer & Benassi, 1981). These beliefs could be 
indicative of an adaptive strategy in mentally healthy individuals, but research has also 
shown that paranormal beliefs might be associated with certain types of 
psychopathological symptoms.
Studies investigating the relationship between general paranormal belief and 
psychopathological symptoms have been driven by two hypotheses. Either paranormal 
belief serves as a prophylactic to ensure mental health (Schumaker, 1990), or such beliefs 
are linked to atypical thinking characteristic of psychopathology. Evidence for the former 
hypothesis is limited to studies that focused on the relationship between religiosity and 
psychologically maladaptive outcomes, although religiosity has been operationally 
defined in various ways, ranging from church attendance to traditional religious beliefs 
measured by the 4-item subscale of the revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS-R; 
Tobacyk, 1988). For example, Martin (1984) found a negative correlation between 
religiosity (church attendance) and suicide rates. An inverse relationship has also been 
found between religiosity (religious activity) and emotional distress (Ness & Wintrob, 
1980) and between religiosity (PBS-R) and general psychopathology (Schumaker, 1987).
A larger body o f evidence has supported the hypothesis that people reporting 
higher levels of psychopathological symptoms tend to report higher levels of paranormal 
belief than nonsymptomatic people. Magical ideation, a type of paranormal belief, has 
long been identified as a symptom of schizotypal and schizophrenic prone people in the 
clinical literature, and was included as a primary symptom of schizotypal personality 
disorder in the third edition of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980). To identify psychosis proneness in the general
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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population, Eckblad and Chapman (1983) developed the Magical Ideation Scale (Magld). 
Combined with the Perceptual Aberration Scale (PercAb; Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 
1978), both scales have been demonstrated to be an effective assessment tool for 
psychosis proneness. In a 10-year longitudinal study, participants scoring high on the 
Magld and PercAb reported significantly more psychotic episodes and schizotypal 
symptoms than controls (Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad, & Zinser, 1994).
Zusne and Jones (1982) argued that magical thinking is at the root of belief in any 
phenomena that violates the laws of nature. Numerous studies showing consistently 
strong positive correlations between magical ideation and general paranormal belief 
(Peltzer, 2003; Thalboume, 1985; Thalboume & French, 1995) and with the specific 
beliefs of psi, precognition, superstition, and witchcraft (Tobacyk & Wilkinson, 1990) 
have supported this hypothesis, although considerable item overlap exists between the 
Magld and paranormal belief scales. For this reason, Thalboume and Delin (1993) 
suggested removing eight paranormal-like items from the Magld. The correlations have 
consistently remained significant when using a reduced Magld (Thalboume, Bartemucci, 
Delin, Fox, & Nofi, 1997; Thalboume & Delin, 1994).
A literature review produced only one study that investigated the relationship 
between psychopathological symptoms and paranormal belief using both the reduced 
Magld and PercAb. In a college sample, Thalboume (1994) found that Magld and 
PercAb combined scores correlated significantly with general paranormal belief scores. 
Other psychopathology measures assessing for psychotic symptoms have been 
administered, but support for an association between psychopathological symptoms and 
paranormal belief is limited. Dag (1999) administered the Revised Symptom Checklist 90
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(SCL-90; Derogatis, 1977) to a Turkish sample and found a small significant relationship 
between a global index of psychiatric symptoms and general paranormal belief, a 
relationship primarily due to correlations with spiritualism and superstition subscales. 
Peltzer (2002) assessed psychotic tendencies using Eysenck’s Personality Questionnaire 
(Francis, Brown, & Philipchalk, 1992) and found a relationship with psi and with 
religious belief in a South African sample. Houran, Irwin, and Lange (2001) found that 
schizotypal symptoms predicted only beliefs associated with New Age Philosophy, and 
not with general paranormal beliefs.
The hypothesis of a positive association between paranormal belief and mood 
symptoms has also been investigated. Thalboume et al. (1997) and Thalboume and 
French (1995) reported a small significant relationship between self-reported depressive 
experience and general paranormal belief. Flowever, Thalboume and Delin (1994) 
previously reported a small positive but nonsignificant correlation using the same 
measures. Thalboume, Keogh, and Crawley (1999) also failed to produce a significant 
relationship between depressive experience and general paranormal belief; although a 
moderate positive correlation was found between depressive experience and magical 
ideation. In all of these studies, manic or manic-depressive experiences significantly 
correlated with paranormal belief.
Further evidence in support of a paranormal belief and depressive symptoms link 
can be found in Clancy, McNally, Schacter, and Pitman (2002) in which participants 
reporting alien abduction also reported significantly higher depressive symptoms than 
control participants, and in Dudley and Whisnand (2000) who reported a positive 
significant correlation between general paranormal belief and depressive attributional
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style. Presson and Benassi (2003) also found a relationship between depressive symptoms 
and belief in paranormal abilities on actual psi tasks. Paranormal illusory control 
judgments of university participants were assessed after psychokinesis and precognition 
tasks were performed. Participants scoring higher on depressive symptoms exhibited 
higher paranormal illusory judgments. What sets Presson and Benassi (2003) apart from 
previous relevant work is the addition of a non-paranormal contingency task group. 
Participants in the higher depressive symptom group who performed a standard 
contingency task (cf. Alloy & Abramson, 1979) showed significantly lower levels of 
illusory judgment than did the paranormal task groups, suggesting that people reporting 
depressive symptoms are likely to make illusory judgments of control for events that in 
reality are not controllable, but less likely to misjudge their role in events unrelated to 
magical causation.
Few studies have demonstrated a link between personality dimensions suggestive 
of psychological adjustment and paranormal belief. Results from studies investigating the 
relation of neuroticism to paranormal belief have been mostly mixed (Irwin, 1999). A 
consistent finding, though, appears to be on actual performances of paranormal tasks. 
Neurotic people tend to perform at chance levels or below, whereas well-adjusted people 
tend to perform at above chance levels (Irwin, 1999).
Tobacyk and Mitchell (1987) reasoned that paranormal beliefs are often related to 
putative extranormal personal abilities, which could be congruent with a narcissist’s 
fantasy o f unlimited powers and success. Using Raskin and Hall’s (1979) Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory, they found a nonsignificant relationship with the total scores of the 
PBS-R, although they found narcissism to be related to psi and precognition scores.
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Using the same measures, Roe and Morgan (2002) similarly found a nonsignificant 
relationship with the PBS-R total scores. However, the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale 
(ASGS; Thalboume, 1995) was also administered, which resulted in a small significant 
positive correlation with narcissism. Roe and Morgan suggested the difference in results 
between the two belief scales was that the person-centered “I” statements o f the 
Australian Sheep-Goat Scale are more likely to be endorsed by people who have 
narcissistic tendencies as opposed to the more general PBS-R items, although they did 
not explore this hypothesis.
Overall, a positive association between psychopathology symptoms and magical 
ideation appears to be a robust finding. However, research assessment of the extent to 
which psychosis proneness is related to paranormal belief has been limited. Mood 
symptoms appear to be consistent correlates o f paranormal belief and paranormal illusory 
control, although the findings have been mixed. The explication o f these relationships is 
central to this dissertation.
Individual Difference Variables
Pizagalli, Lehmann, and Brugger (2001) demonstrated a greater tendency of 
believers in the paranormal to exhibit enhanced reactivity to semantic association 
compared to skeptics. They purported that believers’ higher inclination to provide 
uncommon associations to unrelated words is similar to the associative processing found 
in highly creative people and in people with thought disorders. According to the authors, 
all three have in common the presence of judgments for loose semantic associations.
The association between creativity and paranormal belief is not a new area of 
investigation. Joesting and Joesting (1969) reported that people who tended to be
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creatively motivated also believed in psi and ESP more than non-creative people. In 
support of this finding, Moon (1975) found that artists believed in ESP to a greater degree 
than nonartists. People who tend to be creative also score higher than noncreative people 
on scales that assess fantasy proneness and hypnotic susceptibility (Lynn & Rhue, 1988; 
Thalboume, 1985). The Tellegen Absorption Scale (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), which 
was originally designed to assess hypnotic susceptibility, also assesses for the broader 
trait of openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences. Scores on this scale have also 
been shown to correlate with fantasy proneness (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van 
Breukelen, & Wessel, 2004; Lynn & Rhue, 1986). Thus, there appears to be a link 
between creativity, fantasy proneness, and absorption. The extent that these individual 
difference variables covary is a point of interest, but more important for the present 
investigation is that absorption is suggestive of dissociative phenomena, and has been 
shown to correlate positively with psychopathology measures (Horselenberg et al., 2004) 
and general paranormal belief (Gow, Lang, & Chant, 2004; Irwin, 1991). Clancy et al.
(2002) revealed that participants reporting recovered or repressed memories of alien 
abduction scored significantly higher on absorption than controls. The same individuals, 
on average, scored significantly higher on Magld, PercAb, and depressive symptoms.
Irwin (1993) proposed that fantasy proneness and a heightened need for control 
facilitate the development of paranormal beliefs, which provide an illusion of control for 
events that are random and uncontrollable. Believers might also perceive events to be the 
result of external forces outside of their control. That is, they tend to exhibit an external 
locus o f control. Briefly, one is more externally-oriented if outcomes tend to be perceived 
to be due to luck, fate, or to other external events, and one is more internally-oriented if
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outcomes tend to be perceived to be contingent on one’s own actions. Scheidt (1973) was 
the first to demonstrate a relationship between external locus of control and supernatural 
beliefs in a U.S. sample, although the sample size was small and the supernatural scale 
developed for the study had not been validated. Using Rotter’s (1966) locus of control 
scale, a substantial number of studies since then have confirmed Scheidt’s results (Allen 
& Lester, 1994; Groth-Mamat & Pegden, 1998; Jones, Russell, & Nickel, 1977; Randall 
& Desrosiers, 1980; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). However, Haraldsson (1981) reported a 
nonsignificant relationship between paranormal belief and external locus of control, and 
Dag (1999) found a significant relationship with only the traditional religious beliefs 
subscale of the PBS-R. One study was found in a literature search that administered 
Levenson’s (1972) tri-dimensional locus of control scale to assess the relationship with 
paranormal belief. Peltzer (2002) reported a positive correlation between general 
paranormal belief and the three locus of control subscales - internal, powerful others, and 
chance orientation. No association was found between externality and the precognition 
and psi subscales; internal scores correlated positively with precognition and negatively 
but nonsignificantly with psi.
The majority o f these studies used college samples, which were likely to be 
negatively skewed with regard to involvement in paranormal phenomena as opposed to 
adults who might show a broader range o f involvement by frequenting paranormal 
events1. McGarry and Newberry (1981) administered a locus of control scale and a
1 The statement is speculative, although Messer and Griggs (1989) provide some support for the 
lack o f  involvement o f  college students in the paranormal despite high paranormal beliefs. In a college 
sample, 18% reported at least being involved in or experienced in psi on one occasion compared to 47% 
reporting belief in psi.
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involvement in paranormal activity had significantly higher internal locus of control 
scores than low-involved visitors. Involvement, they reasoned, is likely to enhance 
feelings of power and efficacy, thus shifting the locus of control to a more internal 
orientation. According to McGarry and Newberry, the results suggest that the degree of 
involvement might mediate the relationship between paranormal belief and locus of 
control (p. 734)2.
The relationship between locus of control and psychological disturbance has been 
extensively investigated. A moderately strong positive correlation between external 
control and the degree of depressive symptoms has been a consistent and robust finding 
(Benassi, Sweeney, & Dufour, 1988; Presson & Benassi, 1996). People who tend to 
perceive events as uncontrollable and have a particular attribution style are more prone to 
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Externality has also been shown to 
correlate with anxiety, the SCL-90 global index of psychopathology (Hale & Cochran, 
1987), and schizophrenia (Croft, Johnson, & Fox, 1975; Lasar & Loose, 1994).
In sum, the association between locus o f control and depressive symptoms has 
been more consistent than the relationship between locus of control and paranormal 
belief. The latter findings might be due to how control is operationalized. Locus of 
control was initially conceptualized as a unidimensional construct with internal and 
external locus of control as opposite ends of a bipolar continuum (Rotter, 1966). A series 
of inconsistent findings using Rotter’s scale led to the development of a multidimensional 
control scale (Levenson 1972), which consists of two external subscales defined as either
 ^According to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) distinctions between mediator and moderator, the term 
moderate is more appropriate.
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having a belief that control is governed by human forces (i.e., powerful others) or 
nonhuman forces (i.e., chance). For those individuals who believe in powerful others, 
outcomes are predictable and the potential for control exists. For those who believe in 
chance, outcomes are unpredictable and control is not possible.
Despite the psychometric improvements on locus of control, both Rotter’s and 
Levenson’s scales do not distinguish between realistic and unrealistic control. The 
assumption in paranormal belief research is that such beliefs develop out of a need to feel 
in control for events that are uncontrollable (Irwin, 1999). Moreover, people high in 
paranormal belief tend to discount the role of chance (Williams & Irwin, 1991). That is, 
compared to skeptics, they are less likely to distinguish between skill and chance related 
outcomes. Thus, paranormal belief is likely to be more associated with beliefs related to 
unrealistic control than beliefs related to realistic control. Recently, Zuckerman, Knee, 
Kieffer, Rawsthome, and Bruce (1996) developed realistic control and unrealistic control 
belief scales to assess perceived control over controllable events (realistic control) and 
perceived control over uncontrollable events (unrealistic control). They found that people 
high in unrealistic control belief were more likely to make tasks appear more positive 
than they objectively were. This cognitive bias resembles the judgment of paranormal 
believers who report greater illusion of control on paranormal tasks.
Suggested Integration 
A linear heuristic model of paranormal belief that incorporates the research 
findings presented in this review is illustrated in Figure 1. The evidence in the 
paranormal belief literature points to cognitive, personality, and psychological 
maladaptive differences between believers and skeptics. For reasons not yet fully
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understood, some individuals develop ways of thinking about the world that appear to 
serve as compensatory cognitive processes that fulfill psychological needs (Russell & 
Jones, 1980). These individuals learned in childhood to adapt creatively to environmental 
uncertainty by engaging in fantasy and magic. However, atypical thinking persists into 
adulthood. Whether out o f a need for control (Irwin, 1993) or to reduce anxiety 
(Schumaker, 1990), causal concepts develop in a way that maintain the formation of 
magical relationships to the extent of rejecting the notion of chance (Lesser & Paisner, 
1985). In other words, meaningful coincidences occur more frequently with believers 
than with skeptics, who are more likely to perceive seemingly related events as chance 
(Zusne & Jones, 1982). Possibly, a life-altering event (e.g., a prophetic dream) might 
exaggerate atypical thinking.
The cognitive processing of such individuals can be characterized by enhanced 
processing marked by a disinhibition of associations (Gianotti & Mohr, 2001), loose 
semantic processing (Pizagalli, Lehmann, & Brugger, 2001), and by drawing unfounded 
inferences (Hergovich, 2003). This type of cognitive processing works in concert with 
psychological needs and personality characteristics in the formation of paranormal beliefs 
and other types of magical ideation. The formation of causal concepts and resulting 
paranormal beliefs is also influenced by cultural artifacts, the media, and education.
Depending on the extent of “loose” cognitive processing and other personality 
characteristics (e.g., absorption, control orientation), individuals high in paranormal 
belief might exhibit judgment errors and psychopathological symptoms. Reinforced by 
the perception of self or external influence on personally relevant uncontrollable events,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24




Ju d gm en t
E rrors
Psychopathological






















■ Major life- 
altering events
P ow erfu l Personal 
E xperien ces
C ognitive  
processing and  
developm ent o f  
causal concepts
Discounts









Figure 1. Linear M od el o f  Paranormal B e lie f
paranormal belief becomes one of other ways and means for an illusion o f control to 
endure (Irwin, 1999).
Rationale for Experimental Investigation
The relationship between psychopathological symptoms and paranormal belief 
was explored in the present investigation. The aim was to administer a broad range of 
psychopathological symptoms and to assess whether they relate to paranormal belief, and 
to further explore possible relationships between psychopathological symptoms and 
illusion of control on actual paranormal tasks. Two different designs were employed, not 
to pit one against the other, but to assess whether psychopathological symptoms are 
related to both paranormal belief and illusion of control.
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The majority o f paranormal belief studies investigating the relationship between 
psychopathological symptoms and paranormal belief have assessed the relationship by 
administering one psychopathology measure and one paranormal belief measure. In all of 
the Thalboume studies, the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS) scores were correlated 
with psychopathology measures, including the Magld, PercAb, and a mood scale 
consisting of a 9-item depressive experience scale and a 9-item manic experience scale.
In one study, Thalboume (1994) assessed psychosis proneness using the combined Magld 
and PercAb scores. The two scales combined were demonstrated to be a strong predictor 
of psychosis proneness, particularly if the Social Anhedonia Scale (SocAnh; Eckblad, 
Chapman, Chapman, & Mishlove, 1982) is included in the assessment (Chapman et al., 
1994). Given the limited research investigating the relationship between psychosis 
proneness and paranormal belief, many questions remained unanswered. First, can 
Thalboume’s (1994) results be replicated? Will the inclusion of SocAnh to the psychosis 
proneness measures augment the positive correlations found in Thalboume (1994)? Will 
similar relationships be found using other paranormal belief measures? Will similar 
relationships be found among self-report scales and illusion of control measures? The aim 
of the present investigation was to answer these questions.
Thalboume and colleagues have found manic experience to correlate consistently 
with paranormal belief, but depressive experience has been shown to be a weak correlate. 
The evidence is limited to the relationships found between the ASGS and the 9-item 
depressive experience scale. Depression is a multifaceted phenomenon for which 
numerous scales exist. Although considerable item-overlap exists among measures, 
depression scales vary greatly in design, psychometric properties, and in factor structures.
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For example, the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CESD; Radloff, 
1977), which assesses the frequency of symptoms related to depressive mood, positive 
affect (reverse-scored), somatic symptoms, and interpersonal problems, differs from the 
Hamilton Depression Inventory (HDI; Reynolds & Kobak, 1995), which was designed to 
measure the severity of depression in patients diagnosed as having depressive illness. The 
sub-scores of the HDI that check for melancholy and major depression could also be 
informative. Correlating other depression measures with multiple paranormal belief 
scales could be an important addition to the paranormal belief literature.
A major focus of the present investigation was to extend the findings from 
Presson and Benassi’s (2003) laboratory study that revealed a positive relationship 
between illusion of control on paranormal tasks and depressive symptoms. Administering 
a range of psychopathology measures addresses whether the relationship extends beyond 
depressive symptoms. Also, increasing the number of paranormal tasks to include 
precognition, telepathy, psychokinesis, and clairvoyance will extend the findings from 
Presson and Benassi (2003) in which only psychokinesis and precognition tasks were 
employed.
In Study 1, the relationship between paranormal belief and depressive symptoms 
is investigated. In Study 2, the relationship between illusion o f control on laboratory 
paranormal tasks and depressive symptoms is explored. Studies 1 and 2 have a specific 
purpose to establish a basis from which a more comprehensive investigation of the 
relationship between psychopathological symptoms and paranormal belief is assessed. 
Studies 3 and 4 extend the findings from studies 1 and 2 in several directions.




Although substantial evidence supports the hypothesis of a positive association 
between paranormal belief and depressive symptoms (Thalboume et al., 1997; 
Thalboume & French, 1995), other studies failed to support the hypothesis (Thalboume 
et al., 1999; Thalboume & Delin, 1994). In all of the Thalboume studies, the Australian 
Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS, Thalboume, 1995) total scores were correlated with total 
scores from a 9-item depressive experience subscale of the Manic-Depressiveness Scale 
(Thalboume, Delin, & Bassett, 1994). The results obtained in the Thalboume and 
colleague studies could have been a limitation of the two measures. The goal of the 
present study was to extend the Thalboume studies by administering a different 
depression and paranormal belief scale.
Depressive symptoms were hypothesized to be positively associated with general 
paranormal belief. Participants in the high depressive symptoms group were predicted to 




The sample consisted of 971 (709 females, 262 males) university students who 
participated for class credit. The majority of the participants were first-year students 
(65%), ranging in age from 18 to 51 (M =  18.86; SD = 1.92).
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Materials
Belief in the Paranormal Scale (BPS). The BPS was adapted from Jones, Russell, 
and Nickel (1977). The scale comprises 20 items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
= Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree. After items 4, 16, and 19 are reverse-scored, 
the range of possible scores is 20-100. The scale consists of statements about psychic 
phenomena in general, ESP, telepathy, and precognition. Six of the questions were 
modified to tap self paranormal abilities. For example, “I believe that I can project my 
thoughts to another person.”
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression (CESD). The CESD (Radloff,
1977) is a widely used scale for epidemiological research in depression. The scale 
comprises 21 items that were incorporated from other previously validated scales (Katz, 
Shaw, Vallis, & Kaiser, 1995). Items were developed to assess the frequency of 
depressive symptoms along four domains: depressive affect, positive affect, somatic 
symptoms, and interpersonal relations. Items are rated on a four-point scale, scored from 
0 to 3. Items 4, 8, 12, and 16 were reversed-scored. The range of possible scores is 0-60. 
Procedure
Scale packets were administered after informed consent forms were signed and 
collected. General instructions were given pertaining to filling out the scales, and 
anonymity was assured. No verbal instructions were provided that would indicate the 
purpose of the study.
Results
BPS scores were positively related to CESD scores, r  = .08, p < .02. CESD scores 
were converted to z-scores to form high and low depressive symptoms groups
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(high: > +0.5; low: < -0.5). A t~test was computed to assess for mean differences in BPS 
scores between high and low depressive symptom groups. On average, participants in the 
high depressive symptoms group reported higher paranormal belief scores (M =  51.61;
SD = 10.65) than their lower symptomatic counterparts (M=  49.63; SD = 10.72), t(579) = 
2 .22 , p  < .05, although the effect size was fairly small, d  = .193.
Discussion
As hypothesized, depressive symptoms and general paranormal belief were 
positively related and paranormal belief was shown to vary as a function of depressive 
symptoms. The results extend previous findings (Thalboume et al., 1997; Thalboume & 
French, 1995) by demonstrating the link between depressive symptoms and paranormal 
belief with the administration of a paranormal belief scale that had not been previously 
correlated with depression scores, and a depression scale widely used in epidemiological 
studies in depression that had not been previously correlated with paranormal belief. The 
results should be viewed with caution, however, given the large sample size and small 
effect size.
Further exploration of the relationship between depressive symptoms and 
paranormal belief could be informative by employing different research designs. For 
example, Presson and Benassi (2003) engaged participants in paranormal tasks and found 
that illusion of control was positively related to depressive symptoms. Following this line 
of inquiry, Study 2 explores the association between depressive symptoms and 
paranormal belief by shifting the investigation into the laboratory.
3 Sex differences are not reported in the present results or in subsequent studies because few main 
effects or interactions were found.




Until recently, paranormal belief research had been limited to self-report 
measures of general paranormal belief. Presson and Benassi (2003) established a 
laboratory design to examine the relationship between depressive symptoms and 
paranormal illusory control by engaging students in actual paranormal tasks. Illusion of 
control was reasoned to be “an explanatory construct for belief in personal paranormal 
ability” (p. 486). The goal of the present study was to replicate Presson and Benassi
(2003).
Participants reporting a high level of depressive symptoms were hypothesized to 
exhibit a higher illusion of control than participants reporting few symptoms.
Method 
Participants and Procedure
The sample consisted of 158 participants (males = 68; females = 94) who 
participated for class credit. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 41 (M  = 19.59; SD = 
3.60).
Materials
The 23-item Hamilton Depression Inventory (HDI; Reynolds & Kobak, 1995) 
was administered to assess the severity of depressive symptoms. Items assess sad affect, 
anhedonia, sleep and appetite problems, energy loss, and other cognitive and somatic
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symptoms. Raw scores can range from 0-73 and were computed using the manual scoring 
system (Reynolds & Kobak, 1995).
A die funnel was used in which the participants tossed the die down a shaft 
designed to hide the outcome from the participant’s view (cf. Benassi, Sweeney, & 
Drevno, 1979; Presson & Benassi, 2003). The funnel was an 8” x 8” x 3’ wooden chute, 
angled at approximately 30 degrees, and propped on a table so that participants could 
easily toss a die down the chute while standing. Attached to the chute at the receiving end 
was an enclosed wooden box in which the die landed.
Procedure
One participant at a time completed a survey packet followed by the participation 
in a psychokinesis task. Psychokinesis was defined as the alleged ability to affect matter 
or an outcome by thought alone. Participants selected one of three die and were 
instructed to attempt to influence the outcome of the die to land on one of two colors. The 
die was then tossed down the die funnel shaft. The experimenter retrieved the die at the 
other end, recorded the result, and returned the die to the participant. Three practice trials 
preceded 20 experimental trials. After the task performance, participants responded to the 
question, “How much control did you have over the die?” (PK Control) on a scale 
1 = None to 7 = A Great Deal.
Results
HDI scores were positively related to PK Control scores, r  = .19, p < .02. HDI 
scores were converted to z-scores to form high and low depressive symptoms groups 
(high: > +0.5; low: < -0.5). A /-test was computed to assess for mean differences in the 
illusion of control score between high and low depressive symptom groups. On average,
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participants in the high depressive symptoms group reported higher illusion of control 
(M=  2.43; SD -  1.56) than their lower symptomatic counterparts (M =  2.02; SD = 1.20). 
However, the difference was not significant, i(109) = 1.26, p = .116.
Discussion
The data were analyzed to assess whether illusion of control as a proxy measure 
for paranormal belief was associated with depressive symptoms. Results were consistent 
with those reported in Study 1, although a significant effect was found for only one of the 
two analyses reported. The result is also consistent with the results reported in Presson & 
Benassi (2003) and in Thalboume and colleagues’ (1995; 1997) view that paranormal 
belief tends to be associated with greater levels of psychopathological symptoms. As 
noted by Thalboume (1995), though, of the psychopathology measures that tend to 
correlate with paranormal belief, depressive symptoms appear to be relatively weak 
correlates, which was evident in Study 1 and in the present investigation.
Notwithstanding, a consistent relationship between depressive symptoms and 
paranormal belief was demonstrated with two different research methods (Study 1 and 
Study 2): a task study in which a self-report measure of paranormal belief was 
administered and a laboratory study in which an illusion of control question was given 
after participants performed paranormal task. A considerable amount of uncertainty still 
exists as to the extent that other psychopathological symptoms are associated with self- 
report paranormal belief and illusion of control. Further, the extent that the relationships 
are consistent across other paranormal belief measures and the extent that the 
relationships are consistent across other laboratory paranormal tasks is unknown (e.g., 
telepathy and clairvoyance).
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The purpose of Study 3 was to extend paranormal belief research in several 
directions by incorporating multiple measures of psychopathology and paranormal belief 
and by assessing the extent that performance judgment on four laboratory paranormal psi 
tasks vary as a function o f psychopathological symptoms.




Evidence in support of a positive relation between symptoms associated with 
psychopathology and magical or paranormal belief have focused on three types of 
psychopathological symptoms: psychotic (Dag, 1999; Peltzer, 2002; Thalboume, 1994), 
depressive (Thalboume et al., 1997; Thalboume and French, 1995), and manic symptoms 
(Thalboume et al., 1997; Thalboume and Delin, 1994; Thalboume and French, 1995; 
Thalboume, Keogh, and Crawley, 1999). The purpose of the present study was to extend 
previous findings by administering multiple psychopathology scales in each o f three 
domains: psychotic, mood, and personality maladaptive symptoms. Nine 
psychopathology scales and three commonly used paranormal belief scales were 
administered to determine the extent and consistency o f relationships within each domain 
and across the three paranormal belief scales.
A major focus of the present study was to move the investigation into the 
laboratory to examine the relationship between psychopathological symptoms and 
paranormal illusory judgments. In Study 2, judgments were limited to a psychokinesis 
task, and in Presson & Benassi (2003), participants performed psychokinesis and 
precognition tasks. Two additional tasks were added to assess whether the association 
between paranormal illusory judgment and depressive symptoms also extends to 
telepathy and clairvoyance. Incorporating the laboratory design coupled with the 
administration o f self-report paranormal belief measures in one study also provided a
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basis from which to explore whether similar or different patterns of effects emerged for 
scale and task results.
Given the evidence for an association between paranormal belief and 
psychopathological symptoms, both self-reported paranormal belief and illusion of 
control on paranormal tasks were predicted to be positively related to psychosis 
proneness and mood symptoms. Participants high in psychopathological symptoms were 
expected to report significantly higher levels of paranormal belief and illusion of control 
than participants who were less symptomatic.
Evidence for a link between paranormal belief and maladaptive personality 
tendencies such as neuroticism (Irwin, 1993; Peltzer, 2002) and narcissism (Roe and 
Morgan, 2002; Tobacyk and Mitchell, 1987) has been mixed. For this reason, no 
prediction was made for the relation of narcissism and neuroticism to paranormal belief 
and illusion of control.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 193 (females: 131; males: 62) university students who 
participated for class credit. The majority of the participants were first and second year 
students (80.3%), ranging in age from 18 to 45 (M =  19.78; SD = 2.48).
Materials
Belief Scales.
1. Belief in the Paranormal Scale (BPS). The BPS was adapted from Jones, 
Russell, and Nickel (1977). The scale comprises 20 items on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree. After items 4, 16, and 19 are
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reverse-scored, the range of possible scores is 20-100. The scale consists of statements 
about psychic phenomena in general, ESP, telepathy, and precognition. Six of the 
questions were modified to tap self paranormal abilities. For example, “I believe that I 
can project my thoughts to another person.” Cronbach’s alpha for the sample was 0.92
2. The Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS; Thalboume, 1995) comprises 16 
items that tap beliefs and experiences in telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and 
psychokinesis, plus two additional items that address life after death, totaling 18 forced- 
choice T/F items. The range of possible scores is 0-36. Cronbach’s alpha for the present 
sample was 0 .88 .
3. The 26-item Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS-R; Tobacyk, 1988) 
includes seven subscales that tap traditional religious beliefs, belief in psi, witchcraft, 
superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms, and precognition. Responses to items 
range from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree. After item 23 is reverse-scored, 
the possible range o f scores is 26-182. Cronbach’s alpha for the sample was 0.91.
Psychopathology Measures.
1. Eckblad and Chapman (1983) developed the Magical Ideation Scale (Magld) to 
assess for schizotypy in the general population. The 30-item scale measures odd, 
unconventional beliefs about a variety of events and experiences (e.g., “I have had the 
momentary feeling that someone’s place has been taken by a look-alike”). Combined 
with the 35-item Perceptual Aberration Scale (PercAb; Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin,
1978), the two scales were demonstrated to be an effective assessment tool for psychosis 
proneness (PsycProne) (Chapman et al., 1994). PercAb assesses bizarre self-bodily 
distortions (e.g., “I sometimes have had the feeling that my body is abnormal”) and other
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types of distorted perceptions (e.g., “Sometimes people whom I know well begin to look 
like strangers”). The inclusion of the Social Anhedonia Scale (SocAnh; Eckblad, 
Chapman, Chapman, & Mishlove, 1982) augments the psychosis proneness assessment 
(Chapman et al., 1994). The same eight paranormal-like items suggested by Thalboume 
and Delin (1993) were removed (1, 4, 16, 18, 24, 27, 28, and 30), plus two additional 
items (2 and 8) because of their paranormal content. Cronbach’s alpha for the sample 
were Magld = 0.67, PercAb = 0.85; SocAnh = 0.86.
2. Participants completed the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression 
(CESD; Radloff, 1977), a widely used scale for epidemiological research in depression. 
The scale comprises 21 items that were incorporated from other previously validated 
scales (Katz, Shaw, Vallis, & Kaiser, 1995). Items were developed to assess the 
frequency of depressive symptoms along four domains: depressive affect, positive affect, 
somatic symptoms, and interpersonal relations. Items are rated on a four-point scale, 
scored from 0 to 3. Items 4, 8, 12, and 16 were reversed-scored and the range of possible 
scores is 0-60. Cronbach’s alpha for the sample was .91
3. The 23-item Hamilton Depression Inventory (HDI; Reynolds & Kobak, 1995) 
was administered to assess the severity of depressive symptoms. The HDI was designed 
to measure symptoms of depression specific to the DSM-IY diagnosis of major 
depression. Items assess sad affect, anhedonia, sleep and appetite problems, energy loss, 
and other cognitive and somatic symptoms. Raw scores range from 0-73 and were 
computed using the manual scoring system (Reynolds & Kobak, 1995). A score of two or 
greater on the Major Depression checklist (HDI-MD) indicates that the depressive 
symptoms are consistent with a DSM-IV diagnosis.
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4. Thalboume et al. (1994) developed the Manic-Depressiveness Scale (T-Depr; 
T-Mania) comprised of two 9-item forced-choice T/F self-report subscales that measure 
features associated with a history of mania and clinical depression. The scale has been 
used extensively in paranormal belief research. Cronbach’s alpha for the sample was 
T-Depr = 0.70, T-Mania = 0.87.
5. The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NarcPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988) is a 
40-item Yes/No forced-choice scale designed to measure the extent of narcissistic 
personality characteristics. The majority of items are “I” statements that form six factors: 
exhibitionism, superiority, entitlement, exploitativeness, self-sufficiency, and vanity. The 
NarcPI is the standard measure of narcissism in psychological research for normal 
populations (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Cronbach’s alpha for the sample was 0.85.
6 . The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised Short Form -  Neuroticism 
(NEUROT; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1992) comprises 12 forced-choice Yes/No items. The 
scale taps whether individuals are anxious, moody, overly emotional, and the extent that 
they worry and act in irrational, rigid ways. Cronbach’s alpha for the sample was (N) = 
0.84.
7. The Tellegen Absorption Scale4 (ABSOR; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) was 
administered to assess for openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences. The 34- 
item forced choice T/F scale comprises the six factors, responsiveness to engaging
4 Absorption is not necessarily pathognomonic o f  a particular disorder, although high scores might 
be suggestive o f  dissociative phenomena. Its inclusion among psychopathology measures is for 
simplification o f  scale organization into the two groups, paranormal belief scales and psychopathology 
measures.
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stimuli, synesthesia, enhanced cognition, oblivious/dissociative involvement, vivid 
reminiscence, and enhanced awareness. Cronbach’s alpha for the sample was 0.92.
Task Materials. A quarter was used for the telepathy, psychokinesis, and 
precognition tasks, and a cardboard barrier was used to hide the coin toss results. For the 
clairvoyance task, a mobile blackboard was used to hide the experiment assistant from 
the view o f the participants. The scale packet consists o f forms for the participant to 
record their task responses. Additionally, a questionnaire that participants completed after 
the telepathy, precognition, and clairvoyance tasks included items that assessed 
participant’s perceived control or influence in the task (see Appendix A), followed by 
items that consisted of questions and statements about the tasks in general. More details 
of the tasks are presented below.
Procedure
No greater than 10 participants attended a given session. Scale packets were 
administered after informed consent forms were signed and collected. General 
instructions were given pertaining to completing the scales, and anonymity was assured. 
No verbal instructions were provided that would indicate the purpose of the study.
A page appeared after the paranormal belief scales and psychopathology measures 
were completed with the instructions to stop and to not turn the page until all participants 
completed the scales. After completion, the experimenter explained the second half of the 
study, which included the participation in four paranormal tasks. Instructions were 
provided to turn to the next page. The first task, telepathy, was explained and a definition 
was provided as the ability o f one person to mentally send or receive a signal from  
another person without the use o f  the known five physical senses. The experimenter
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flipped a coin behind a barrier, recorded the result, and with eyes closed said, “I will 
concentrate and send the result of the coin toss, either head or tail.” Participants were 
instructed to also close their eyes, concentrate, and attempt to receive the result. After a 
two second pause, the experimenter said, “record” to prompt the participants to record the 
result on a sheet provided in the experiment packet. Three practice trials preceded 15 
experimental trials. After the trials were completed, participants were instructed to turn 
the page and respond to the four post-trial questions (see Appendix A).
The second task, precognition, was defined as the ability to foresee or know an 
outcome before it happens. The procedure was similar to the telepathy task with the 
exception that the experimenter began by stating, “Concentrate and determine the 
outcome before I toss the coin.” After a two second pause, the experimenter prompted the 
participants to record, and then the experimenter flipped the coin and recorded the result. 
After the trials were completed, participants were instructed to turn the page and respond 
to the four post-trial questions.
The third task, psychokinesis, was defined as the ability to affect matter or an 
outcome by thought alone. Participants were instructed to concentrate as the experimenter 
flipped the coin and said, “Concentrate and cause the coin to land as . . .” The 
experimenter read either head or tail from a randomized preordered list of 15. After the 
trials were completed, participants were instructed to turn the page and respond to the 
four post-trial questions.
The final task, clairvoyance, was defined as the ability to receive information 
from distant objects, persons, or events, even through opaque objects, without the use o f  
the known five  physical senses. Participants were instructed to “concentrate and
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determine whether the experiment assistant [who stood behind a barrier] is staring at 
you.” Whether the assistant stared or not was determined from a randomized preordered 
list. After a two second pause, the experimenter prompted participants to record Yes or 
No. After the trials were completed, participants were instructed to turn the page and 
respond to the four post-trial questions and the last sheet which included the questions or 
statements about the tasks in general.
Although recorded, the responses on each trial (e.g., head/tail or yes/no) were not 
analyzed for accuracy. Only the post-trial illusion of control responses were analyzed.
Results 
Scale Analyses
Magld and PercAb correlated positively with all three paranormal belief scales 
(Table 1). Additionally, the ABSOR scores consistently correlated positively across all 
three scales. Participants who scored higher on magical ideation, perceptual aberration, 
and absorption tended report higher levels of paranormal belief than their less 
symptomatic counterparts. Two psychopathology measures correlated with only one 
belief scale. A small positive correlation was found between mania and paranormal belief 
but only with ASGS scores. Neuroticism correlated negatively with BPS scores.
A series of multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) was performed to 
assess the extent that general paranormal belief varied as a function of 
psychopathological symptoms5. For each psychopathology measure, z-scores were 
computed to form low and high groups. Scores less than -0.5 standard deviation were
5 Psychopathological symptoms could also vary as a function o f  paranormal belief. The manner in 
which the data are presented and the wording adheres to the manner in which similar analyses have been 
presented in previous research (cf. Presson & Benassi, 2003).
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Table 1. Bivariate Correlation Matrix of Three Paranormal Belief Scales and Psychopathology 
Measures
BPS ASGS PBS-R
Magld 0.53*** 0.68*** 0.52***
PercAb 0.30*** q 29*** 0.28***
SocAnh -0.05 0.05 -0.09
PsycProne 0.43*** 0.57*** 0.42***
NEUROT -0.18* -0.08 -0.13
NarcPI 0.11 0.13 0.13
ABSOR 0.36*** 0.50*** 0.35***
CESD -0.07 0.06 -0.06
T-Mania 0.06 0.25** 0.13
T-Depr 0.02 0.13 0.06
HDI -0.02 0.07 -0.03
HDI-MD -0.05 0.01 -0.09
* p  <  .05, * * p  < .01, *** p  <  .001
assigned a value of 1 and scores greater than 0.5 were assigned a value of 2. The results 
revealed significant differences in paranormal belief between high and low Magld, 
PercAb, PsycProne, NEUROT, and ABSOR (Table 2). That is, paranormal belief varied 
as a function of psychosis proneness with high believers reporting significantly higher 
psychopathological symptoms than low believers. All three paranormal belief scales 
contributed to the overall effect for the psychosis related scales as indicated by the 
between-subjects effects. The same pattern was found with ABSOR. The pattern of 
means was in the opposite direction for NEUROT on all three scales. High believers 
reported significantly lower neuroticism than low believers. The BPS was the main 
contributor to the effect.
The only mood scale that significantly differentiated general paranormal belief 
was T-Mania (Table 2). Overall, paranormal belief varied as a function of mania with
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T able 2. M ultivariate F V alu es and L ow  and H igh  P sych op ath ologica l Sym ptom  M eans  
(Standard D ev ia tion s) for Three Paranormal B e lie f  Scales
M ultivariate
BPS ASGS PBS-R F (df) Eta2
Magld
Low 40.40 12.39)*** 4.78 (4.29)*** 68.49 (21.72)*** 45 27*** .54
High 56.08 10.56) 16.68 (6.88) 99.23 (21.12) (3,117)
PercAb
Low 44.55 13.10)*** 7.09 (5.98)*** 77.43 (24.34)** g .19
High 53.88 11.46) 14.15 (8.21) 93.44 (22.05) (3,107)
SocAnh
Low 47.75 11.57) 9.54 (7.18) 86.97 (23.03) .88 .02
High 46.89 15.06) 10.75 (8.78) 86.11 (27.52) (3,119)
PsycProne
Low 41.58 12.01)*** 5.40 (4.23)*** 72.66 (21.28)*** 32.12*** .46
High 54.51 9.85) 15.86 (7.24) 97.35 (19.34) (3,112)
NEUROT
Low 51.47 12.27) ** 11.26 (8.14) 87.48 (22.22) 3.04* .08
High 44.84 12.86) 9.14(7.14) 80.18 (26.09) (3,113)
NarcPI
Low 46.97 12.15) 8.87 (6.58) 82.37 (23.67) 1.49 .04
High 49.02 12.62) 11.47 (7.74) 90.26 (25.95) (3,103)
ABSOR
Low 42.49 11.90)*** 5.89 (4.66)*** 74.49 (22.05)*** 13.63*** .25
High 52.27 12.82) 13.55 (8.26) 93.11 (23.92) (3,125)
CESD
Low 47.05 12.71) 9.00 (7.33) 83.05 (22.99) 1.05 .03
High 58.04 13.70) 11.04 (7.63) 84.41 (26.01) (3,108)
HDI
Low 46.96 12.71) 9.35 (7.79) 81.01 (22.25) .32 .01
High 48.78 13.35) 10.71 (7.65) 84.51 (26.13) (3,117)
T-Depr
Low 48.23 12.02) 9.85 (7.44) 83.85 (23.19) .64 .02
High 50.56 14.35) 12.03 (7.64) 89.76 (25.60) (3,90)
T-Mania
Low 46.48 11.70)* 7.85 (6.49) 79.52 (23.62)* 2.84* .08
High 48.77 12.27) 15.86 (7.72) 87.57(25.15) (3,104)
* p  < .05, **p  < .01, *** p  < .001
high believers reporting higher levels o f mania than low believers. Two of the three belief 
scales, BPS and PBS-R, contributed to the effect.
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Task Analyses
All task measures were converted to z-scores. A factor analysis was performed on 
all task variable z-scores using alpha factoring extraction to insure maximal internal 
consistency of factors. Promax oblique rotation was used because of the intercollinearity 
of the items. Five factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were extracted, which 
accounted for 79.1% of the total variance (Table 3). Four of the five factors were related 
to the four tasks, each consisting of the three questions related to 1) how many trials 
correct, 2) trials others correct, and 3) if  another 100 trials, how many trials correct (see 
Appendix A for full item wording). The first factor accounted for 41.2% of the variance 
and consisted o f the three clairvoyant task items (CLAR). The second factor accounted 
for 12.54% of the variance and consisted of the three precognition task items (PRE). The 
third factor (WELL), which accounted for 10.1 % of the variance, was eliminated because 
the factor consisted of the “how well did you perform” items from each of the four tasks. 
Including the factor in subsequent analyses would not be informative. The fourth factor 
accounted for 8.9% of the variance. The items that loaded on the factor were the three 
psychokinesis items (PK). The fifth factor accounted for 6.4% of the variance. The items 
that loaded on the factor consisted of the three telepathy items (TEL).
All paranormal task factors correlated ranging from 0.32 to 0.62 (Table 4). Two 
of the task factors, TEL and PK, correlated with all three paranormal belief scales (BPS, 
ASGS, and PBS-R), with PK having the strongest relation to the scales. The CLAR factor 
was not related to any of the paranormal belief scales.
Psychosis proneness measures correlated significantly in a positive direction with 
PRE, TEL, and PK factors (Table 5). Moreover, SocAnh correlated significantly with
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Table 3. Factor Loadings for the Four Paranormal Task Illusion of Control Measures

















PRE = precognition, PK 
rating, TEL = telepathy
= psychokinesis, CLAR = clairvoyance, WELL = combined task achievement
Table 4. Bivariate Correlation Matrix of the Four Paranormal Task Factors and Belief Scales
PRE TEL PK CLAR
TEL 0.62***
PK 0.34*** 0.45***
CLAR 0.45*** 0.46*** q 22***
BPS 0.05 0.20** 0.36*** 0.06
ASGS 0.09 0.19* 0.35*** 0.05
PBS-R 0.05 0.18* q 32*** 0.06
PRE = precognition, TEL = telepathy, PK = psychokinesis, CLAR = clairvoyance 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 5. Bivariate Correlation Matrix of Four Paranormal Task Factors and Psychopathology 
M easures
PRE TEL PK CLAR
Magld 0.15* 0.21** 0 33*** 0.06
PercAb 0.21** 0.21** 0.19** 0.15*
SocAnh 0.15* 0.17* 0.016 0.05
PsycProne 0.21** 0.23** 0.28*** 0.13
NEUROT 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.07
NarcPI 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.07
ABSOR 0.06 0.12 0.19* 0.06
CESD -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.11
HDI 0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.02
HDI-MD 0.09 0.03 0.07 -0.03
T-Depr 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.02
T-Mania 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.01
T-D/M 0.11 0.11 0.17* 0.02
PRE = precognition, TEL = telepathy, PK = psychokinesis, CLAR = clairvoyance 
* p  <  .0 5 ,  ** p  <  .0 1 , ***p  < .0 0 1
PRE and TEL. Although not necessary for the assessment of psychosis proneness, the 
addition of SocAnh augments the Magld and PercAb to produce a superior measure of 
psychosis proneness (Chapman et ah, 1994). Only PercAb correlated significantly with 
the CLAR factor. The PK factor’s relationship with psychopathological symptoms 
appeared to extend to mood and absorption. The combined scores of T-Depr + T-Mania 
(T-D/M) and ABSOR correlated significantly with the factor. Thus, the PK factor 
correlated more strongly with paranormal belief scales, psychosis proneness, depressive 
and manic symptoms, and absorption. A clear pattern emerged indicating that participants 
scoring higher on psychosis proneness tended to demonstrate a greater level of 
paranormal illusory judgments on precognition, telepathy, and psychokinesis tasks. A 
similar pattern was also revealed with psychopathology measures and paranormal belief
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scales. The pattern appears to extend into additional psychopathology domains for 
participants performing the psychokinesis task.
To assess whether illusion of control for each of the four paranormal tasks 
differed as a function of psychopathological symptoms, an average o f all item z-scores in 
each paranormal task factor was computed to form an illusion o f control measure, and 
then transformed to a standardized scale (M = 50; SD = 10). A series of MANOVAs was 
then performed to assess differences in high/low psychopathological symptoms on the 
four factors, PRE, TEL, PK, and CLAR. The results revealed significant differences 
between high and low Magld, PercAb, and PsycProne on the task factor scores (Table 6). 
The statistical effects demonstrated that illusion of control scores varied as a function of 
psychosis proneness. Participants high in psychosis proneness symptoms reported greater 
levels of illusion of control than nonsymptomatic participants. Three of the task factors, 
PRE, TEL, and PK, contributed to the effect of PsycProne as indicated by the between- 
subjects effects, although all four tasks contributed to the effect of PercAb.
No multivariate effects were found for any of the mood scales (Table 6).
However, between-subject effects were found to be significantly different between 
high/low groups for T-Depr, HDI-MD, and T-Mania on PK. Participants with a higher 
illusion of control were more symptomatic of depression, major depression, and mania 
for PK. The high/low scores on the CESD and HDI, although nonsignificant for PK, were 
in the same direction.
The illusion of control measures for the task analyses were the participants’ 
judgments of their abilities to perform paranormal tasks. Their judgments might have 
been influenced by a host of other reasons including paranormal belief. For example,
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Table 6. Multivariate F values and Low and High Psychopathological Symptom Means (Standard 
D eviation s) for Four Paranormal Task Factors
Multivar.
PRE TEL PK CLAR F (df) Eta2
Magld
Low 48.87 13.75) 47.77 13.72)* 47.30 10.93)** 49.22 14.88) 3.29* .10
High 52.55 12.74) 53.22 12.19) 55.73 15.39) 51.20 12.79) (4,119)
PercAb
Low 48.14 13.31)** 47.49 13.15)** 47.98 11.39)** 49.05 13.83)* 3.35* .11
High 55.83 10.71) 55.24 12.89) 54.63 14.38) 54.93 12.83) (4,111)
SocAnh
Low 48.23 13.36)* 47.57 12.85)* 48.71 12.14) 49.28 12.52) 1.78 .06
High 53.98 12.67) 52.59 13.67) 50.20 11.90) 50.82 13.18) (4,121)
PsycProne
Low 48.66 13.55)** 47.82 13.47)** 46.84 10.38)** 48.94 14.77) 4.15* .13
High 55.61 10.32) 55.49 11.37) 54.58 14.55) 51.79 12.72) (4,116)
NEUROT
Low 49.67 14.43) 49.19 13.35) 49.60 12.57) 51.06 12.63) .75 .03
High 49.43 13.75) 51.12 12.85) 51.58 13.65) 49.21 14.33) (4,116)
NarcPI
Low 49.23 12.34) 49.07 13.56) 50.45 12.54) 48.61 12.59) .51 .02
High 51.94 13.86) 51.85 10.74) 51.21 12.56) 51.19 12.78) (4,105)
ABSOR
Low 50.71 12.59) 49.20 12.30) 47.94 10.17) 49.99 14.62) 1.11 .03
High 50.02 13.14) 50.72 13.55) 51.71 14.39) 49.65 13.98) (4,127)
CESD
Low 50.74 13.74) 51.07 13.15) 47.92 11.55) 52.15 11.69) 2.17 .07
High 50.76 13.96) 50.78 13.07) 52.47 13.70) 49.01 12.20) (4,109)
HDI
Low 49.25 14.20) 50.06 13.79) 48.13 11.95) 49.36 12.87) 1.02 .03
High 52.03 12.92) 51.43 12.92) 52.42 13.75) 49.97 13.27) (4,118)
HDI-MD
Low 50.06 12.98) 50.61 12.67) 48.66 11.83)* 51.34 13.58) 2.12 .08
High 53.41 13.18) 54.23 11.60) 55.56 14.32) 50.60 12.14) (4,105)
T-Depr
Low 50.68 14.68) 51.65 12.65) 48.45 10.19)* 50.69 14.18) 1.58 .06
High 52.94 12.22) 52.99 13.30) 53.94 11.72) 53.12 12.49) (4,94)
T-Mania
Low 47.99 15.15) 48.71 13.32) 46.32 8.74)* 48.75 14.97) 1.62 .06
High 50.97 12.09) 51.88 12.52) 50.56 11.18) 49.28 14.45) (4,106)
PRE = precognition, TEL = telepathy, PK = psychokinesis, CLAR = clairvoyance 
* p  < .0 5 , **p < .0 1 , ***p < .0 0 1
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participants who thought that they performed better than chance on a particular task 
might have thought that they were lucky, or they might have been simply guessing. In 
fact, over 80% of participants reported that they were guessing. Participants might 
estimate their successes at better rates than chance but not necessarily believe in the 
paranormal. After the four paranormal tasks were completed, participants responded to, 
“Paranormal processes influenced my responses” (Para; see Appendix A). The influence 
statement was included in the general survey as a check to assess whether the differences 
in illusion of control scores on psychopathology measures were consistent with belief in 
paranormal phenomena. A series of ANOVAs was performed to assess the differences in 
Para between high and low psychopathological symptom groups. Table 7 displays the 
mean differences in Para. Participants high in both psychosis proneness and mood 
symptoms thought that paranormal processes influenced their responses to a greater 
extent than participants low in psychopathology scores. The results, which are consistent 
with the between-subject effects found in the scale analyses, provide strong evidence that 
differences in illusion of control scores reflect real differences in personal paranormal 
belief, and that these differences vary as a function of psychosis proneness (Magld, 
PercAb, SocAnh), and mood symptoms (T-Depr, HDI, T-Mania).
Despite that a majority of participants reported guessing when they responded to 
the statement, “I was guessing” (Guess), the large negative correlation between Para and 
Guess (r = -0.70) suggests that the more participants believed in paranormal influences 
the less they tended to guess. A t-test was computed to test for Guess group differences 
on Para scores. High guessers who responded agree or strongly agree were coded 1 and 
low guessers who responded strongly disagree, disagree, or neutral were coded 2. A
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Table 7. Univariate F values and Low/High Psychopathological Symptom Means (Standard 





Low 1.46 (0.86) 24.86*** .17
High 2.30(1.00) (1,123)
PercAb
Low 1.56 (0.87) 8.89** .07
High 2.11 (1.06) (1,115)
SocAnh
Low 1.68 (0.80) 4.37* .03
High 2.0 2 (1.02) (1,125)
PsycProne
Low 1.39 (0.75) 27.44*** .19
High 2.2 2 (1.00) (1,120)
ABSOR
Low 1.47 (0.68) 18.12*** .12
High 2.12(1.04) (1,131)
HDI
Low 1.58 (0.92) 4.31* .03
High 1.94 (0.98) (1,122)
T-Depr
Low 1.60 (0.79) 9.27** .09
High 2.17(1.03) (1,97)
T-Mania
Low 1.47 (0.74) 5.02* .04
High 1.81 (0.83) (1,110)
* p  <  .0 5 ,  ** p  < .0 1 , *** p  <  .0 0 1
significant difference was found between high (M = 1.59; SD = 0.77) and low (M = 2.81; 
SD = 1.03) guessers on Para scores, t(193) = 6.37, p < .001, d = 1.34.
In addition, Para was significantly related to many of the task items (Table 8). The 
strongest correlation was with the two psychokinesis task items which assessed for 
participants’ perceived psychokinesis influence (r = .61) and their judgments on others’ 
psychokinetic influence on the task (r = .62). The range o f coefficients for all other task 
items was from 0.10 to 0.38, and the average was 0.25. The average of the two
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PRE = precognition, PK = psychokinesis, CLAR = clairvoyance, WELL = combined task achievement 
rating, TEL = telepathy; * p  <  .05, **p  <  .01, *** p  <  .001
psychokinesis coefficients (0.62) was more than 2.5 times the average of the other items 
and over 1.5 times as large as the next strongest correlate (PK-Well). The association 
between Para and psychopathological symptoms and its relation to the psychokinesis task 
items provides strong evidence for the greater number of effects on this task relative to 
the other paranormal tasks.
Sign Test Analysis
As an additional analysis, a sign test was performed on nine psychopathological 
symptom high/low mean pairings (Magld, PercAb, SocAnh, CESD, HDI, T-Depr, 
T-Mania, NarcPI, NEUROT) and ABSOR for the three paranormal belief scales totaling
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30 pairings (10 x 3). A second sign test analysis was performed with the same scales for 
the three illusion of control measures (correct, others correct, 100-correct) for all four 
tasks, totaling 120 pairings ( 1 0 x 3 x 4  = 120). For each test, pairings that consisted of 
means such that the larger paranormal belief mean (scales) or the illusion of control mean 
(tasks) was in the high psychopathological symptom group was assigned a plus (+), 
whereas pairings in which the mean was larger in the low psychopathological symptom 
group were assigned a minus (-). The probability of 27 pairings of paranormal belief 
means and the probability of 96 pairings of illusions of control means for which the 
larger mean was in the high psychopathological symptom group each was p  < .001. The 
low probability result in each test provides further evidence o f an overall general 
tendency of participants high in psychopathological symptoms to report a high degree of 
paranormal belief or illusion of control.
Discussion
O f the nine psychopathology measures that were administered, psychosis 
proneness was the most consistent correlate o f paranormal belief and illusion of control. 
The pattern of significant between-group differences was very similar among the three 
analyses between psychosis proneness measures (magical ideation and perceptual 
aberration) and three paranormal belief measures (general paranormal belief, paranormal 
illusory control, and the belief that paranormal processes influenced task responses). 
Students reporting higher levels of psychosis proneness reported greater levels o f general 
paranormal belief, greater judgments in personal paranormal abilities, and greater belief 
in paranormal processes.
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Significant differences between high and low mood symptoms were not as 
prevalent as psychosis proneness. Still, participants reporting high manic symptoms 
tended to report greater levels of general paranormal belief, and participants high in 
depressive and manic symptoms tended to report greater illusion o f control on the PK 
laboratory task. The results are consistent with the findings reported in the two previous 
studies and in Thalboume and colleagues (1995, 1997) for which depressive experience 
was shown to be associated with paranormal belief, albeit weakly, and for which manic 
experience was shown to be a stronger correlate of paranormal belief than depressive 
experience (Thalboume & Delin, 1994).
The results also conceptually replicated and extended Presson and Benassi (2003) 
by demonstrating that depressive and manic symptoms are related to illusion of control 
on a psychokinesis task, and by demonstrating relationships between additional 
psychopathology measures and illusion of control on paranormal tasks beyond 
psychokinesis and precognition. The present analysis also provided validity for illusion of 
control as a proxy for personal paranormal belief, given that the belief in paranormal 
processes item was significantly related to almost all illusion of control measures.
The clairvoyance factor was statistically unrelated to every psychopathology 
measure, with the exception of perceptual aberration. The procedural difference might 
have contributed to the lack of statistical findings on this task. In the precognition, 
telepathy, and psychokinesis tasks, the experimenter tossed a coin directly in front of the 
participants. Only the experimenter’s hands were hidden behind a barrier. For the 
clairvoyance task, the experimenter stood behind a portable blackboard throughout the 
trials. With the experimenter’s presence minimized, the focus could have shifted from the
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experimenter to other participants. The effect of experimenter presence vs. absence on 
participant behavior has been well-document (Benassi & Mahler, 1985; Hettich &
Walker, 1970; Kent, Brown, Kanowitz, O’Leary, & Cheiken, 1977; Milgram, 1974). 
Although speculative, fatigue might also have been a contributor given the task was run 
last.
In sum, the results are consistent with the view that paranormal believers on 
average exhibit greater levels of psychological maladjustment than their skeptical 
counterparts (Zusne & Jones, 1982; Thalboume et al, 1997). All results considered, those 
from the paranormal influence analysis (Para) perhaps best demonstrated this view. The 
belief that paranormal processes influence one’s judgment or abilities on tasks in which 
outcomes are uncontrollable varied as a function of eight measures related to maladaptive 
functioning, including psychosis proneness and depressive and manic symptoms.
In the present study, participants passively participated in paranormal tasks in the 
company of other students. This arrangement could have been a limitation and might 
have contributed to the lack of statistical effects that were expected to be found. The 
paranormal tasks were likely to be unfamiliar to most of the participants. Given the 
nature of the tasks and the mere presence of other peers who sat in close proximity to 
each other, participants might have been less motivated to engage in the tasks or to take 
them seriously before their peers. In Presson and Benassi (2003), participants performed 
paranormal tasks with only the experimenter present in the room. The passive 
participation could also have minimized an illusion of control for participants prone to 
believe in magical causation. Although the results of the present investigation revealed a 
consistent association between psychopathological symptoms and paranormal belief, a
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more active role by participants might result in greater statistical effects. On the other 
hand, if  the tasks were to be performed singularly with a more active role by participants, 
and the results bare few differences from the present results, then those results will also 
be informative. Under this scenario, the implications could be that beyond practice trials, 
further induction strategies might not be necessary. The results would also suggest that 
more involvement in the tasks has little effect on paranormal illusory control.
Another concern with the design is that the responses to the scales might have 
affected the responses on the task measures, which immediately followed the scale 
completion. Council (1993) recommended administering materials in two sessions when 
the context of the research situation differ. In addition to minimizing context effects, 
administering scales and tasks in two separate sessions will also address the concern for 
participant fatigue.




Similar to the previous study, the present investigation was conducted to explore 
the extent to which psychopathological symptoms relate to paranormal belief and illusion 
of control. However, a number of modifications were implemented. Only 
psychopathology measures for which there was evidence of a consistent positive 
relationship with paranormal belief in Study 3 were retained. Context effect and fatigue 
concerns from Study 3 were also taken into consideration for design modification.
Instead of counterbalancing, which Council (1993) found to be ineffective in reducing a 
context effect, scales and tasks were administered in two sessions. The advantage of 
separate sessions, in addition to the elimination of scales that were found to be unrelated 
to paranormal belief, was expected to minimize fatigue.
To eliminate group effects and to create an environment more conducive to 
illusory induction, participants performed paranormal tasks one at a time. The procedure 
of the laboratory tasks was modified to approximate more closely previous illusion of 
control research by Benassi and colleagues (Benassi, Sweeney, & Drevno, 1979; Presson 
& Benassi, 2003). Langer (1975) suggested that skill factors (e.g., choice and 
involvement) introduced into chance situations cause individuals to feel inappropriately 
confident, because the factors make the uncontrollable outcomes appear to be more 
controllable. Moreover, Langer and Roth (1975) reasoned that individuals are highly 
motivated to perceive events as controllable to such an extent that one cue is sufficient to
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induce an illusion of control. For example, if  participants receive feedback on a string of 
coin flip successes early in the procedure, they report a higher number of successes than 
participants who did not receive a primacy success feedback. For this reason, 
modifications included a more active role of participants in paranormal tasks, the choice 
of materials to perform in the task, and primacy success feedback on the precognition 
task.
Two additional modifications included the manipulation of task order and the 
addition of two influence statements to the general survey that was completed after 
participation in all three tasks. Besides the statement, “paranormal processes influenced 
my responses,” participants also responded to “my beliefs in paranormal phenomena 
influenced my responses” and “my ability in these tasks influenced my responses” 
(Appendix A). All three influence statements served to bridge illusion o f control and 
paranormal belief. That is, because paranormal belief scales and illusion of control 
measures were assessed separately one week apart, the general influence statements were 
designed to tap participants’ paranormal belief and ability specific to paranormal task 
performance.
Participants reporting high levels of psychosis proneness (magical ideation and 
perceptual aberration symptoms) and mood (manic and depressive symptoms) were 
hypothesized to report significantly higher levels of paranormal belief and illusion of 
control than participants low in psychopathological symptoms. No systematic differences 
were expected to be found as a result of task order.




The sample consisted of university students (n = 237) who participated for class 
credit. Of the 119 participants (females: 81; males: 38) from whom demographic 
information was collected, the majority o f the participants were first-year students 
(87.3%), ranging in age from 17 to 39 (M = 18.53; SD = 2.07).
Materials
Belief Scales. The paranormal belief scales included the Belief in the Paranormal 
Scale (BPS; Jones, Russell, & Nickel, 1977), Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS; 
Thalboume, 1995), and the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS-R; Tobacyk, 1988). 
The psychopathology measures included the Magical Ideation Scale (Magld; Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1983), Perceptual Aberration Scale (PercAb; Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 
1978), Social Anhedonia Scale (SocAnh; Eckblad, Chapman, Chapman, & Mishlove, 
1982), the Thalboume Depressive and Manic Experience Scales (T-Depr, T-Mania; 
Thalboume, Delin, & Bassett, 1994), and the Tellegen Absorption Scale (ABSOR; 
Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).
Tasks. Three dice, each painted red and green on alternate sides, and a die funnel 
were used for the psychokinesis task. The die funnel was an 8” x 8” x 3’ wooden chute, 
angled at approximately 30 degrees, and propped on a table so that participants could 
easily toss a die down the chute while standing. Attached to the chute at the receiving end 
was an enclosed wooden box in which the die landed. A die return funnel made of 3” 
cardboard tubing was constmcted so that the experimenter could return the die without 
having to hand the die to the participant (which minimized visual contact). Three quarters
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were used for the precognition task and four card stacks each comprised of 10 through 
Ace of each suit were used for the telepathy task. The participant packet included illusion 
of control measures for each task and survey items about all the tasks in general 
(Appendix A).
Procedure
Participants attended two sessions, one week apart. In the first session, scale 
packets were administered after informed consent forms were signed and collected. 
Anonymity was assured and general instructions were provided for scale completion. 
Participants were asked to provide the last four digits of their student ID for the purpose 
o f matching their scale packets with their responses in the second session. The scales 
were completed in approximately 30-45 minutes.
One week later, in the second 30-minute session, each participant was greeted one 
at a time. Participants were asked to write the same identifying number that they used a 
week earlier in the first session. A brief explanation was provided about paranormal 
psychology and three paranormal tasks: psychokinesis, precognition, and telepathy. The 
first task, psychokinesis, was defined as the ability to affect matter or an outcome by 
thought alone. Participants were instructed to select one of three dice. The experimenter 
sat at the retrieval end of the die funnel behind a barrier, and the participant was 
instructed to concentrate and attempt to make the die roll to a predetermined color 
provided by the experimenter. After the participant tossed the die down the funnel, the 
experimenter retrieved the die, recorded the result, and returned the die down the die 
return funnel. Two practice trials preceded 14 experimental trials. After the task was 
completed, the participant was instructed to complete the post-task measures.
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The second task, precognition, was defined as the ability to foresee or know an 
outcome before it happens. The participant sat in a chair and was instructed to select one 
of three quarters and to hand it to the experimenter. The experimenter stood behind the 
participant and instructed the participant to concentrate on the coin flip that was about to 
be performed and to record the predicted result with either H for head or T for tail. Two 
practice trials preceded 14 experimental trials. The experimenter tossed the coin and 
recorded the result. However, the experimenter provided false feedback. Regardless of 
the actual results, the experimenter told participants that they were correct on 5 of the 
first 7 trials, and correct on 2 of the last 7 trials. In all, seven correct responses and seven 
incorrect responses were provided. After the task was completed, the participant was 
instructed to complete the post-task measures.
The third task, telepathy, was defined as the ability o f a person to mentally send 
or receive a signal from  another person without the use o f  the known five  physical senses. 
Participants were instructed to pick one of the four decks of cards and to shuffle the deck. 
On the other side of a barrier, the experimenter sat at a desk. Participants were instructed 
to turn the top card and record the card by circling 10, J, Q, K, or A. The participant was 
then instructed to concentrate and telepathically send the card to the experimenter. After 
the participant said, “sending,” the experimenter recorded 10, J, Q, K, or A. The 
participant was reminded to shuffle and to repeat the procedure. Two practice trials 
preceded 14 experimental trials. After the task was completed, participants were 
instructed to complete the post-task measures followed by the general task survey.




Magld, PercAb, T-Mania, T-Depr, and ABSOR correlated positively with all 
three paranormal belief scales (Table 9). Participants scoring higher on psychosis 
proneness (magical ideation and perceptual aberration), mania, depression, and 
absorption tended to also report higher levels of paranormal belief than their less 
symptomatic counterparts.
A series of multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) was performed to 
assess the extent that general paranormal belief varied as a function of 
psychopathological symptoms. For each psychopathology measure, z-scores were 
computed to form low and high groups. Scores less than -0.5 standard deviation were 
assigned a value of 1, and scores greater than 0.5 were assigned a value of 2. The results 
revealed significant differences between high and low symptoms of Magld, PercAb, T 
Mania, T-Depr, and ABSOR measures on the paranormal belief measures (Table 10). All 
three paranormal belief scales contributed to the overall effects as indicated by the 
between-subjects effects for each paranormal belief scale. For all five psychopathology 
measures, participants in the high symptomatic group scored higher on all three 
paranormal belief measures than participants in the low symptomatic group.
Task Analyses
All task illusion of control measures were converted to z-scores. A factor analysis 
was performed on all task variable z-scores using alpha factoring extraction to insure 
maximal internal consistency of factors. Promax oblique rotation was used because of the 
intercollinearity. Five factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were extracted, which
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Table 9. Bivariate Correlation Matrix of Three Paranormal Belief Scales and Psychopathology 
Measures
BPS ASGS PBS-R
Magld 0.45*** 0.55*** 0 44***
PercAb
***m© 0 37*** 0.26***
SocAnh -0.09 -0.01 -0.12
PsycProne 0 4 ]*** 0.50*** 0.38***
ABSOR 0 47*** 0.55*** 0 40* * *
T-Depr 0.17* 0.23** 0 .20**
T -Mania 0.15* 0.24** 0.18**
* p  < .05, **p  < .01, *** p  < .001
Table 10. Multivariate F values and Low and High Psychopathological Symptoms Means 





Low 44.08 (10.69)*** 7.93 (6.20)*** 72.20 (20.69)*** 30.12*** .41
High 56.37 (11.93) 18.47 (7.06) 99.83 (23.90) (3,130)
PercAb
Low 47.33 (11.60)*** 10.11 (7.04)*** 81.56 (24.61)** 9 42*** .20
High 55.51 (12.03) 17.42 (7.71) 98.04 (22.47) (3,116)
SocAnh
Low 51.23 (10.44) 11.94 (7.10) 89.73 (24.53) 2.44 .05
High 49.70(13.12) 12.83 (7.83) 85.45 (28.66) (3,131)
PsycProne
Low 46.22 (10.72)*** 8.92 (6.16)*** 77.44 (22.17)*** 22.62*** .32
High 56.83 (11.89) 18.15 (7.29) 100.28 (22.84) (3,143)
ABSOR
Low 44.34 (10.78)*** 8.25 (5.98)*** 77.36(23.37)*** 21.00*** .31
High 56.71 (10.35) 17.40 (7.85) 99.19 (21.88) (3,140)
T-Depr
Low 48.11  (10 .83 )* 10.65 (7 .59 )** 81 .53  (23 .7 1 )* * 3.75* .07
High 52.14(12.38) 14.35 (7.86) 93.15 (24.33) (3,140)
T-Mania
Low 47.10(11.72)* 9.83 (7.22)*** 82.30 (24.26)** 4.97** .08
High 51.34 (11.36) 14.11 (7.62) 91.93 (23.94) (3,165)
*p  < .05, * * p  < .01, ***p  < .001
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Table 11. Factor Loadings for the Three Paranormal Task Illusion of Control Measures













PK = psychokinesis, PRE =  precognition, TEL = telepathy, WELL = combined task achievement rating 
accounted for 70.6% of the variance (Table 11). Three of the four factors were related to 
the three tasks, each consisting of the three questions related to 1) how many trials 
correct, 2) trials others correct, and 3) if  another 100 trials, how many trials correct (see 
Appendix A). The first factor accounted for 34.6% of the variance and consisted o f the 
three telekinesis task items (TEL). The second factor accounted for 14.3% of the variance 
and consisted o f the three psychokinesis task items (PK). The third factor accounted for 
13.5% of the variance. The items that loaded on the factor were the three precognition 
items (PRE). The fourth factor, which accounted for 8.3% of the variance, was eliminated 
because the items that loaded consisted of the “how well did you perform” items from 
each o f the three paranormal tasks (WELL).
The z-scores for each factor item were averaged to form an illusion of control 
measure. Correlations were computed among the task factors and paranormal belief. All
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paranormal task factors correlated ranging from 0.22 to 0.50 (Table 12). Two of the task 
factors, PK and TEL, correlated positively with all three paranormal belief scales. The 
strongest correlations were items related to the PK factor. The PRE factor showed the 
weakest correlations.
Correlations between the illusion of control z-scores and the psychopathology 
measures were computed. Psychosis proneness measures correlated positively with PK 
and TEL (Table 13). The PRE factor was statistically unrelated to any o f the 
psychopathology measures, nor was SocAnh related to any of the task factors. The 
depression and mania scores were only significantly related to TEL. Two similar patterns 
that emerged in Study 3 were found in the present results. The PK factor correlated more 
strongly with paranormal belief scales, psychosis proneness measures, and absorption. 
Also, participants who scored higher on psychosis proneness tended to demonstrate a 
greater level of paranormal illusory judgments on the psychokinesis and telepathy tasks.
The illusion of control z-scores were transformed to a standardized scale (M =  50; 
SD = 10). A one-way ANOVA was performed to assess whether illusion of control scores 
differed as a function of task order. No significant differences were found between the six 
orders on illusion of control scores. A series of MANOVAs was computed to assess the 
extent that high and low psychopathological symptom groups varied as a function of 
illusion of control. Results for the PRE factor are not reported because no significant 
differences between high and low psychopathological symptom groups were found on all 
psychopathology measures. However, significant differences were found between high 
and low Magld, PercAb, and PsycProne on PK and TEL (Table 14). PK was the largest 
contributor to the overall effect found for each psychopathology measure as
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Table 12. Bivariate Correlation Matrix of the Three Paranormal Task Factors and Belief Scales
PK PRE TEL
PRE 0.28***
TEL q 40*** 0 29* * *
BPS 0.31*** 0.11 0.22***
ASGS 0.34*** 0.07 0.24***
PBS-R 0 22*** 0.12 0 .22**
PK = psychokinesis, PRE = precognition, TEL = telepathy, WELL = combined task achievement rating; * 
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Table 13. Bivariate Correlation Matrix of the Three Paranormal Task Factors and 
Psychopathology Measures
PK PRE TEL
Magld 0.26*** 0.00 0 23***
PercAb 0.26*** 0.04 0.22***
SocAnh 0.04 -0.06 0.00
PsycProne 0 29*** 0.02 0.25***
ABSOR 0.26*** -0.01 0.18**
T-Depr 0.13 -0.02 0.15*
T-Mania 0.09 0.07 0.18**
PK = psychokinesis, PRE = precognition, TEL = telepathy, WELL = combined task achievement rating; * 
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
indicated by the between-subjects effects, and the effect size was highest for Magld. 
Overall, illusion of control scores differed significantly between low and high T-Depr 
groups, although the effect size was small.
A series of ANOVAs was performed to assess whether the relationship between 
psychopathological symptoms and illusion of control was consistent with belief in 
paranormal phenomena or abilities to perform paranormal tasks. After participants
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Table 14. Multivariate F values and Low and High Psychopathological Symptom Means
(Standard Deviations) for PK and TEL Task Factors
Multivariate
PK TEL F (df) Eta2
Magld
Low 46.55 (10.39)*** 45.59 (9.94)*** 7 gj*** .21
High 55.60(12.77) 54.68 (12.08) (4,116)
PercAb
Low 46.97 (10.49)*** 47.50 (12.70)* 4.63* .15
High 54.97 (11.57) 53.99(15.20) (4,105)
SocAnh
Low 49.91 (11.26) 48.23 (13.54) .59 .02
High 52.15 (14.78) 48.90(12.71) (4,116)
PsycProne
Low 46.12 (9.78)*** 47.04(11.49)*** 6.61*** .17
High 55.45 (12.92) 55.17(14.70) (4,129)
ABSOR
Low 45.44 (9.17)*** 45.66(12.21)** 4.36** .12
High 53.00 (12.55) 52.20 (13.42) (4,126)
T-Depr
Low 49.36(11.04) 48.34(12.89) 2.60* .08
High 51.42(13.14) 52.45 (13.04) (4,128)
T-Mania
Low 48.80(11.92) 48.28 (12.81) .75 .02
High 51.08 (12.53) 51.74(14.01) (4,147)
PK = psychokinesis, PRE = precognition, TEL = telepathy, WELL = combined task achievement rating; * 
p  <  .0 5 , ** p  <  .0 1 , * * *  p  <  .0 0 1
completed all three tasks, they responded to “Paranormal processes influenced my 
responses” (Para), “My beliefs in paranormal phenomena influenced my responses” 
(Beliefs), and “My ability in these tasks influenced my responses” (Ability). Although 
participants’ responses to the illusion of control items could have been influenced by 
various cognitions other than belief in the paranormal, the results indicate that 
paranormal processes, beliefs, and abilities played a role in their responses. Table 15 
displays the mean differences in Para, Beliefs, and Ability between low and high 
psychopathological symptom groups. Overall, participants high in psychosis proneness
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Table 15. Univariate F values and Low and High Psychopathological Symptom Means (Standard
























































































































































* p < . 0 5 ,  * * * p < . 0 0 1
and mood symptoms reported that paranormal processes, beliefs in paranormal 
phenomena, and their abilities in performing the paranormal tasks influenced their 
responses to a greater extent than participants low in psychopathological symptom scores, 
although differences in Para were found only in the combined T-D/M scale, and mood 
symptoms effect sizes were small. The results, which are consistent with the between- 
subject effects found in the scale analyses, provide strong evidence that differences in 
illusion of control scores reflect real differences in personal paranormal belief and
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abilities, and that these differences vary as a function of psychosis proneness and mood 
symptoms.
A majority of participants were found to have reported guessing on their task 
responses. However, significantly less guessing was reported in the present study 
(M = 3.82; SD = 0.96) than in Study 3 (M =  4.29; SD = 0.86), *(413) = 5.41,p  < .05,d  = 
.52. Further analyses were performed to assess whether there was a difference between 
guessers and non-guessers. The negative correlations between Guess and the three 
influence items (Para: -.46, Beliefs: -.54, Ability: -.35) suggests that the more participants 
believed in paranormal influences or their abilities to perform the paranormal tasks the 
less they tended to guess. An ANOVA was computed to test whether guessers’ and non- 
guessers’ responses differed on Para, Beliefs, and Ability items. High guessers who 
responded agree or strongly agree were coded 1 and low guessers who responded 
strongly disagree, disagree, or neutral were coded 2. Non-guessers scored significantly 
higher than guessers on all three task influence items (Table 16).
In addition, all three task response items were significantly related to many of the 
individual task items (Table 17). A consistent finding was the strong correlations among 
the three task influence items with the two psychokinesis task items (r = 0.40 - 0.68). The 
items assessed for participants’ perceived psychokinesis influence and their judgments on 
others’ psychokinetic influence on the task. The range of coefficients for all other task 
items was 0.01 to 0.40, and the average was 0.19. The average o f the two psychokinesis 
coefficients (0.51) was more than 2.5 times the average of the other items. The strong 
correlations between the psychokinesis task items provide strong evidence for the greater 
number of effects on this task relative to the other paranormal tasks.
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Guessers 1.91 (0.80)*** 2.18 (1.02)*** 2.43 (0.98)*** 20.84*** .22
Non-Guessers 2.58 (0.86) 3.29 (0.95) 3.00 (0.92) (1,218)
*** p <  .0 0 1
Table 17. Bivariate Correlations between Illusion of Control Items and Paranormal (Para), 
Beliefs, and Ability Influence Items
Para Beliefs Abilities
PK-correct 0.17* -.01 .07
PK-influence 0.68*** 40*** 44***
PK-other 0.64*** 42*** 4g***
PK-well 0.27*** .15* 23***
Pre-correct 0.09 .07 .12
Pre-other 0.05 .01 .08
Pre-well q 27*** 22*** 33***
Pre-100 0.14* .09 .14*
Tel-correct 0.36*** 23***
Tel-other 0 22*** .20**
Tel-well 0.40*** 24*** 3 j ***
Tel-100 0.31*** 24*** .21**
PRE = precognition, PK = psychokinesis, TEL = telepathy, WELL = combined task achievement rating; * 
p  < .0 5 , ** p  < .0 1 , *** p  <  .0 0 1
Sign Test Analysis
A sign test was performed on five psychopathological symptom high/low mean 
pairings (Magld, PercAb, SocAnh, T-Depr, T-Mania) and ABSOR for the three 
paranormal belief scales totaling 18 pairings (6 x 3). A second sign test analysis was 
performed with the same scales for all illusion of control items, totaling 72 pairings (6 x
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12 = 72). For each test, pairings that consisted o f means such that the larger paranormal 
belief mean (scales) or the illusion of control mean (tasks) was in the high 
psychopathological symptom group was assigned a plus (+), whereas pairings in which 
the mean was larger in the low psychopathological symptom group were assigned a 
minus (-). The probability of 16 pairings of paranormal belief means and the probability 
of 55 pairings of illusions of control means for which the larger mean was in the high 
psychopathological symptom group each was p < .001. The low probability result in each 
test provides further evidence of an overall general tendency of participants reporting 
higher psychopathological symptoms also report higher levels of general paranormal 
belief and paranormal illusory control.
Discussion
Psychosis proneness and absorption consistently correlated with paranormal belief 
and illusion of control. The pattern of between-group mean differences for psychosis 
proneness and absorption was the same for all analyses, across all three paranormal belief 
scales, and for illusion of control measures on two paranormal tasks. Students reporting 
higher levels of psychosis proneness and absorption reported greater levels of general 
paranormal belief, greater paranormal illusory judgments, and greater belief that their 
task responses were influenced by paranormal processes, beliefs, and abilities in the 
paranormal tasks.
With few exceptions, the analyses of mood symptoms followed a similar 
consistent pattern. Statistical effects were not found between manic high and low 
symptom groups on the paranormal tasks and the Para influence statement. However, in 
response to the general survey Belief and Ability influence statements, participants
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reporting more depressive and manic symptoms reported that their beliefs and abilities in 
paranormal processes influenced their task responses.
Overall, the results were consistent with the findings reported in Study 3. 
Psychosis proneness measures yielded the largest coefficients and effect sizes, whereas, 
mood measures were generally the weakest. The results were so similar that no evidence 
was found in favor of a two-session design. In Study 3, participants completed scales and 
performed tasks in one session. The present study was designed to decrease fatigue and 
increase illusion of control induction, resulting in increased between-group differences on 
paranormal task illusion o f control measures. However, there was no consistent pattern of 
larger coefficients or greater effect sizes. The consistent bilateral increase of both low and 
high psychopathological symptom group means across all psychopathology measures 
indicates that the illusion of control induction procedures worked, but the procedures did 
not induce participants in the high psychopathological symptom group to greater illusory 
control than their nonsymptomatic counterparts as expected.
Despite the induction techniques of primacy feedback, choice of coin, and 
practice, the precognition task was statistically unrelated to all three paranormal belief 
measures and to any of the psychopathology measures. Two procedural aspects might 
have contributed to the lack of statistical effects. First, direct involvement of the 
participants was less than in the telepathy and psychokinesis tasks, in which participants 
sent cards or tossed a die, respectively. Kiesler (1971) suggested that involvement is the 
direct manifestation of commitment. If the precognition task was not conducive to 
participant involvement, then a believer’s worldviews and beliefs related to paranormal 
phenomena (to which they are committed) were less likely to manifest and thus influence
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their responses. McGarry and Newberry (1981) proposed that the degree of involvement 
might moderate the relationship between paranormal belief and locus of control. 
Involvement might also moderate the relationship between paranormal illusory control 
and psychopathological symptoms. That is, the thought processes, feelings, and beliefs 
that are associated with paranormal beliefs, particularly psychopathological symptoms, 
might emerge to a greater extent for believers and to a lesser extent for nonbelievers 
under greater involvement. But involvement might not be a sufficient basis for illusion of 
control differences to emerge between psychopathological symptom groups. Familiarity 
might attenuate the effects. The more familiar participants high in psychopathological 
symptoms are with a task procedure, for example the coin toss, the more likely the task 
will be viewed as unrelated to magical causation. Presson and Benassi (2003) showed 
that participants high in depressive symptoms are less likely to misjudge their role in 
standard contingency tasks (which are perceived to be unrelated to magical causation) 
than when engaged in paranormal tasks for which outcomes are perceived to be 
uncontrollable and thus related to magical causation.
Second, the lack of statistical effects with the precognition task might have 
occurred because participants recorded their predictions before each flip. Participants in 
Langer and Roth (1975) called out their coin toss prediction, which was recorded by the 
experimenter. By recording their predictions, participants might have tracked the 
experimenter’s feedback of seven correct and seven incorrect responses, consequently 
increasing the likelihood o f a binomial prediction. However, 34% of participants in the 
precognition task reported success in eight or more trials compared to only 13% in the 
psychokinesis task. Thus, if participants were counting in the precognition task, less
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
success responses greater than chance would be expected than in the psychokinesis task 
in which counting could not have occurred. The greater frequencies of success responses 
greater than chance in the precognition task supports the primacy feedback procedure that 
was provided as an illusion of control induction technique.




The present dissertation aimed to expand the investigation of the relationship 
between general paranormal belief and psychopathological symptoms by assessing the 
extent and consistency to which the relationship was retained across multiple 
psychopathology and paranormal belief measures. Similarly, the aim was to assess the 
extent to which the same psychopathology measures related to paranormal illusory 
control on multiple laboratory paranormal tasks.
Study 1 explored the relationship between depressive symptoms and paranormal 
belief. Study 2 explored the relationship between depressive symptoms and paranormal 
illusory control. Depressive symptoms were found to be related to both paranormal belief 
and illusion of control. The pattern of results was consistent with previous paranormal 
belief scale studies investigating the association with depressive experience among 
college students (Thalboume et al., 1997; Thalboume & French, 1995) and one 
laboratory task study investigating the association between illusion of control and 
depressive symptoms (Presson & Benassi, 2003). The similarity between the task and 
scale results provided a basis for establishing validity for illusion of control measures on 
laboratory paranormal tasks as a proxy measure of paranormal belief.
Further exploration was needed to assess whether the above findings would 
remain consistent across multiple tasks, and whether both scale and task results would 
extend to other psychopathology measures. Studies 3 and 4 addressed these concerns and
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extended previous work in a number of directions by increasing the number of 
psychopathology measures, paranormal belief scales, and laboratory tasks.
A consistent positive relationship was found between psychopathological 
symptoms and both paranormal belief and paranormal illusory control across three 
paranormal belief scales and paranormal tasks. Psychosis proneness (magical ideation 
and perceptual aberration) and absorption were found to be the most consistent 
psychopathological symptom correlates o f paranormal belief and paranormal illusory 
control. Evidence was also found for depressive symptoms as a reliable but weak 
correlate o f paranormal belief. The results are consistent with Thalboume’s studies that 
found depressive experience to be weakly related (Thalboume et al., 1997; Thalboume & 
French, 1995), and at other times statistically unrelated to general paranormal belief 
(Thalboume et al., 1999; Thalboume & Delin, 1994).
For both Studies 3 and 4, the pattern of results was consistent across all 
paranormal belief scales and paranormal tasks, although correlations and effect sizes 
tended to be weaker for the laboratory tasks. A case could be made that participants 
caught up in the illusion during the tasks did not necessarily believe in the paranormal 
(cf. Ayeroff & Abelson, 1976). The present results provide evidence that participants 
exhibiting greater paranormal illusory control also reported greater paranormal belief. 
Positive correlations between tasks scales, the consistent pattern of results between scale 
and task analyses, and the fact that participants reported that their task responses were 
influenced by paranormal processes, paranormal beliefs, and paranormal abilities 
supports the hypothesis that people who report high levels of paranormal belief and 
abilities tend to be more inducible and thus report higher paranormal illusory control (on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
objectively impossible tasks) than skeptics. The results also provide further evidence for 
paranormal illusory control as a valid measure of belief in personal paranormal ability.
The case could also be made that similarity between scale and task results was, in 
part, due to the order in which scales and tasks were administered. Responding to the 
scales first could have created a context or carryover effect, thereby priming a response 
set for answering illusion o f control measures. This response bias might have been more 
likely to occur in Study 3 in which tasks immediately followed scale completion. If 
participants were primed to respond in a specific manner after completing the paranormal 
belief scales, similar responses would be expected to the illusion of control items. 
Analyses should yield positive correlations between paranormal belief scales and task 
factors regardless of the task or illusion of control questions. Participants’ responses, 
however, appeared to depend on the task and illusion of control item. In Study 3, for 
example, the precognition factor, which was related to all other task factors, was 
statistically unrelated to all three paranormal belief scales. The telepathy factor, on the 
other hand, was found to be related to all other factors and the paranormal belief scores. 
For the two tasks, the illusion of control items were the same with the exception of 
wording that pertained to the task procedure. Why the difference, if  a response set was 
created?
The psychokinesis task yielded the most consistent positive correlations among 
other task factors and paranormal belief scores. One reason for the stronger correlations 
was possibly due to the fact that one item in the psychokinesis task measure differed from 
the other three task measures. The wording, “how much psychokinetic influence do you 
believe you had,” connotes paranormal ability to a greater extent than “on how many
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trials do you think you were correct.” For the same reason, the psychokinesis influence 
items were more strongly related to the “paranormal influence” scores than the other 
three factors. These results alone have implications for future research using the Presson 
and Benassi (2003) task procedures. For the present argument, the evidence shows that 
participants’ responses were related to the task and the illusion of control question, not to 
the procedural sequence.
A context or carryover effect was even more unlikely in Study 4. Tasks were 
performed one week after scale completion in a different physical setting and in the 
presence of a different experimenter. In future work, manipulating the order of scale and 
task administration might address this issue. However, the results will only be 
informative if a difference is found between the two orders. In other words, if the analysis 
between the two orders reveals no difference, a carryover effect still can not be ruled out. 
In the reverse order, task performance and responses could influence scale responses.
The present findings should be viewed within the context of its limitations. The 
most significant limitation is that the samples consisted of relatively high functioning 
university students compared to non-university peers. More severe psychopathological 
symptoms were likely underrepresented, making generalizations about paranormal belief 
in clinical populations more difficult. The data, however, were sufficiently variable to 
form low and high psychopathological symptom groups, albeit artificially. For example, 
in Study 3, scores in the high CESD symptom group ranged from 22-56, all substantially 
greater than the traditional cutoff of > 16 that indicates a risk for depression; also, the 
means of magical ideation, and depressive and manic experience scores were consistent 
with the means of like scores from the schizophrenic sample in Thalboume and Delin
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(1994). Although these examples might minimize the limitations of using college 
students, future research using community and clinical samples can address these 
concerns.
The data did not provide information about whether participants’ reporting of 
experiences related to psychopathology predicted the presence of or risk for 
psychopathology. Nonetheless, the results from this university sample might provide 
fruitful hypotheses about beliefs in clinical cases. Results similar to the present findings 
were found in studies assessing clinical samples in which individuals diagnosed with a 
psychotic disorder reported higher levels of paranormal belief (Thalboume, 1988) and 
higher levels of magical ideation than controls (George & Neufeld, 1987; Thalboume & 
Delin, 1994). The present results were also consistent with Williams and Irwin (1992), in 
which participants with schizotypy scored higher on psi measures and magical ideation 
than controls and medicated participants who were previously diagnosed with 
schizophrenia.
Given the relationship between psychopathology symptoms and paranormal and 
other types of magical thinking found in both clinical and student populations, 
individuals high in these kinds of cognitions might be at risk for developing certain types 
of clinical syndromes. Indeed Chapman et al.’s (1994) longitudinal study demonstrated 
that college participants scoring high on magical ideation and perceptual aberration were 
more likely to report psychotic-like experiences and schizotypal symptoms than low 
scorers at alO year follow-up assessment.
The consistent positive relationship found between psychopathological symptoms 
and both paranormal belief and illusory control raises the question of how paranormal
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belief might be linked to psychopathology. Psychopathological symptoms are generally 
pathognomonic. In the present investigation, the item such as “I have had the momentary 
feeling that I might not be human” differed from the item “I have experienced being so 
sad that I just sat (or lay in bed) doing nothing but feeling bad.” The former item is 
indicative, among others, of psychosis proneness, and the latter item of depression. 
Although overlap may exist, clinical groups generally are discernible by a distinctive set 
of symptoms which vary across several kinds of psychopathology (although many 
individuals cannot accurately be classified into diagnostic groups by psychopathological 
symptoms alone) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
One characteristic in common, however, among certain clinical populations is 
magical beliefs. The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) indicates that psychoses, personality 
disorders, and a disorder related to religious or spiritual problems are accompanied by 
paranormal and magical beliefs and experiences. Atypical thinking is also a principal 
characteristic of mood disorders. Beck’s (1967, 1983) theory of depression maintains that 
underlying dysfunctional beliefs, possibly morbid delusions, can serve as a diathesis for 
the occurrence of depression. Mania is also characteristic of atypical ideations such as 
delusions of grandeur. Broadly conceived, individuals manifesting these various 
symptoms share a commonality -  thoughts about self, the world, or the future that appear 
not to be the result of reasoning; rather, the cognitive processing is consistent with beliefs
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in causal connections between events that are normally not related according to generally 
accepted standards6.
An open question concerns whether the relationship between the effects found for 
mood, perceptual aberration, and absorption can at least, in part, be attributed to the 
variance shared with magical ideation. At the core of the association between the 
psychopathology correlates and people high in paranormal belief is the tendency to 
misconstrue cause and effect, which the magical ideation scale assesses. In the present 
findings, magical ideation, even with the paranormal belief items removed, consistently 
correlated with perceptual aberration, absorption, and depressive and manic symptoms. A 
set of analyses controlling for magical ideation might be informative.
In conclusion, the findings contribute to an increasing body of work by showing a 
consistent association between paranormal belief and psychosis proneness, depressive 
symptoms, and absorption across three paranormal belief scales. The consistent results 
between scale and task research warrant testing of further hypotheses in the laboratory. 
Manipulation o f variables in the lab could reveal cognitive processes that moderate the 
relationship between paranormal illusory control and psychopathological symptoms. For 
example, for reasons previously discussed, involvement might moderate induction and 
thus illusion of control scores. The laboratory could also provide an opportunity to
6 Two studies that addressed a “commonality” theme are worth noting. Pizagalli, Lehmann, and 
B ruggcr (2001) suggested  a com m onality  am ong  creative peop le , paranorm al be lievers , and  peop le  w ith 
thought disorders. The common cognition involves atypical thinking characterized by an inclination to 
exhibit disinhibitions o f  associations. Thalboume and Delin (1994) proposed a cognitive personality factor, 
which the investigators labeled transliminality. The cognitive process acts as a filter that normally would 
prevent ideational and affective material from crossing into consciousness. The commonality consists o f  
magical ideation, mystical experience, manic experience, absorption, hyperaesthesia, dream interpretation, 
and fantasy proneness. The factor is strongly correlated with both paranormal belief and 
psychopathological symptoms.
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disentangle the various forms of control that have been suggested to play a role in the 
development, experience, and maintenance of paranormal belief7. Memory processes 
could also be explored to better understand the cognitive complexity involved in 
paranormal belief and putative abilities. Further research that explores the underlying 
nature of the relationships revealed in the present findings can augment the knowledge 
and understanding of how paranormal belief and other types of magical thinking might be 
related to disorders characteristic o f atypical thinking.
7 For example, the need for control (Irwin, 1993) and belief in realistic and unrealistic control 
(Zuckerman et al., 1996). Also, secondary control as proposed by Case, Fitness, Cairns, and Stevenson 
(2004).
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APPENDIX A: ILLUSION OF CONTROL MEASURES 
Study 3 Task Dependent Measures
Telepathy
1. On how many of the 15 trials do you think you were correct in receiving the signal that was 
sent?
2. On average, how many o f the 15 trials do you think other students were correct in receiving 
the signal that was sent?
3. Overall, how well do you believe you performed on this telepathy task?
(5-point Likert scale 1 = Very poorly to 5 = Very well)
4. I f  you  w ere g iven  another 100 trials on this task, on  h ow  m any o f  the trials do you  think you
would receive the signal (head or tail) that the experimenter sends?
Precognition
1. On how many of the 15 trials do you think you were correct in predicting the outcome (head 
or tail) of the coin flip?
2. On average, how many of the 15 trials do you think the other students were correct in 
predicting the outcome (head or tail) of the coin flip?
3. Overall, how well do you believe you performed on this precognition task?
(5-point Likert scale 1 = Very poorly to 5 = Very well)
4. If you were given another 100 trials on this task, on how many of the trials do you think you
would correctly predict the outcome of the coin flip (head or tail)?
Psychokinesis
1. On how many of the 15 trials do you think the outcome (head or tail) landed on the one in 
which you were concentrating?
2. How much psychokinetic influence do you believe you had on this task?
(10-point Likert scale: 1 = No influence to 10 = A great deal of influence)
3. On average, how much psychokinetic influence do you think other students had on this task? 
(10-point Likert scale: 1 = No influence to 10 = A great deal of influence)
4. Overall, how well do you think you did on this psychokinesis task?
(5-point Likert scale 1 = Very poorly to 5 = Very well)
Clairvoyance
1. On how many of the 15 trials do you think you were correct in sensing whether or not you 
w ere b ein g  stared at?
2. On average, on how many o f the 15 trials do you think the other students were correct in 
sensing whether or not you were being stared at?
(5-point Likert scale 1 = Very poorly to 5 = Very well)
3. Overall, how well do you believe you performed on this clairvoyance task?
4. If you were given another 100 trials on this task, on how many do you think you would be 
correct in sensing whether or not you were being stared at?
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Study 3 General Task Survey
1. You completed four paranormal tasks. In general, what do you think influenced your 
responses to the tasks?
a. Paranormal processes influenced my responses.
1......................... 2 ..........................3 ........................ 4 .......................... 5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
disagree agree or disagree agree
b. I was guessing.
1..........................2 ......................... 3 ......................... 4 ......................... 5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
disagree agree or disagree agree
2. What is the experimenter’s stance on
paranormal belief? Believer Neutral Skeptic
Please indicate True or False with regards to yourself.
3. Whether I think I performed well or poorly on the four paranormal tasks,
I believe that I can perform well on these types of tasks if I were in
the right mood or environment.................................................................................... T
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Study 4 Task Dependent Measures
Telepathy
1. On how many of the 14 trials do you think you were correct in receiving the signal that was 
sent?
2. On average, how many of the 14 trials do you think other students were correct in receiving 
the signal that was sent?
3. O verall, h ow  w ell do you  b elieve  you  perform ed on  this telepathy task?
(5-point Likert scale 1 = Very poorly to 5 = Very well)
4. If you were given another 100 trials on this task, on how many of the trials do you think you
would receive the signal (head or tail) that the experimenter sends?
Precognition
1. On how many of the 14 trials do you think you were correct in predicting the outcome (head 
or tail) of the coin flip?
2. On average, how many of the 14 trials do you think the other students were correct in 
predicting the outcome (head or tail) of the coin flip?
3. Overall, how well do you believe you performed on this precognition task?
(5-point Likert scale 1 = Very poorly to 5 = Very well)
4. If you were given another 100 trials on this task, on how many of the trials do you think you
would correctly predict the outcome of the coin flip (head or tail)?
P sych ok in esis
1. On how many o f the 14 trials do you think the outcome (head or tail) landed on the one in 
which you were concentrating?
2. How much psychokinetic influence do you believe you had on this task?
(10-point Likert scale: 1 = No influence to 10 = A great deal of influence)
3. On average, how much psychokinetic influence do you think other students had on this task? 
(10-point Likert scale: 1 = No influence to 10 = A great deal of influence)
4. Overall, how well do you think you did on this psychokinesis task?
(5-point Likert scale 1 = Very poorly to 5 = Very well)
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Study 4 General Task Survey
Please respond to the following general questions or statements.
A. You completed three paranormal tasks. In general, what do you think influenced your 
responses to the tasks that you just performed?
1. Paranormal processes influenced my responses.
1..........................2......................... 3 ........................ 4 ...........................5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
disagree agree or disagree agree
2. My beliefs in paranormal phenomena influenced my responses.
1....................... 2....................... 3 ........................ 4 ...........................5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
disagree agree or disagree agree
3. My ability in these tasks influenced my responses.
1......................... 2 ......................... 3 ........................ 4 ...........................5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
disagree agree or disagree agree
4. I was guessing.
1......................... 2.......................3 ........................ 4 ...........................5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
disagree agree or disagree agree
B. What is the experimenter’s stance on
paranormal belief (circle on e).......................................... Believer Neutral Skeptic
Please indicate True or False with regards to yourself.
C. Whether I think I performed well or poorly on the three paranormal tasks,
I believe that I can perform as well or better on these types
of tasks if  I were in the right situation or frame of mind.................................  T _____ F ____
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The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and 
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your 
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their 
implementation.
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold 
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the 
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont 
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at 
http://www.hhs.Qov/ohrD/humansubiects/auidance/belmont.htm or by request from the 
OSR. '
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion 
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation 
o f human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
I f  you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to 




Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, 
Service Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-862-3564
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The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection o f Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and 
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your 
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their 
implementation.
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold 
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the 
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont 
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at 
http://www.hhs.aov/ohrp/humansubiects/quidance/belmont.htm or by request from the 
OSR. )
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion 
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation 
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
I f  you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to 
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee.
For the IRB,
Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, 
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Study: Psychopathology and Paranormal Belief
Approval Date: 01/31/2006
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and 
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your 
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their 
implementation.
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold 
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the 
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text o f the Belmont 
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at 
http://www.hhs.Qov/ohfp/humansubiects/Quidance/belmont.htm or by request from the 
OSR.
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion 
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation 
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
I f  you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to 
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee.
For the IRB,
liiWe F. Sirppson 
Manager
cc: File
Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, 
Service Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-862-3564
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